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Abstract 
 
In writing this thesis, I plotted where the streams of whiteness theory, life-
writing theory and practice, and Daphne Marlatt’s novel Ana Historic converge.  
In the introduction, I outline the development of my own subjectivity, focusing on 
my identification with multiple ethnic communities, and on my “racial” and 
working class identity.  My second chapter surveys current whiteness theories, 
accepting some and rejecting others, and drawing significantly upon theory that is 
accessible and personal, a decision that undoubtedly resulted because of my 
working class practicality.  In this chapter, I conclude that whiteness and white 
solipsism (theoretically comparable to Simone de Beauvoir’s challenge that 
masculinity as the neutral and positive gender renders femininity and other 
gendered constructions negative), actually envelope multiple identities, but argue 
that the way in which whiteness is experienced by those on its margins is often 
monolithic.  In the third chapter, I investigate Marlatt’s biography and her life 
writing theory, arguing that her experience as a “once immigrant” foregrounds 
many issues relevant to the Canadian white identity, and that because her theory is 
so conscious of how identity is constructed, relying on fact and fiction, Ana 
Historic provides a portrait of white Canadian identity and the context in which 
that identity has been constructed.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I apply the theories of life 
writing and whiteness to the characters of Ana, Ina, and Annie, challenging that 
their identities as “colonizer,” “emigrant,” and “immigrant,” respectively, 
illustrate the evolution resulting in the current white Canadian identity.  Further, 
because Marlatt chooses these characters who occupy different positions in 
history, she shows her reader that contemporary Canadian white identity has 
grown out of colonial times, creating a continuum.  The history out of which each 
of these women emerges is never contained because aspects of their identity carry 
forward into subsequent generations. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
I can think of no better way to begin the introduction to my project on life 
writing and white, Canadian identity(ies) than to introduce myself.  I was born in 
1972 in Saskatchewan, and am a third-generation Canadian on both sides of my 
family.  These are the facts, as bare as I can possibly present them. With only this 
knowledge, you, my reader, have begun to create a mental image of what I look like 
and who I am.  While my year and place of birth, and my nationality contribute to 
who I am as a person, I am comprised of much more.  What are the contributors to 
and markers of one’s identity? 
My great grandparents all immigrated to North America in the early 1900’s.  
They were Mennonites who had been forced to leave one European/Soviet country 
after another because as pacifists they refused to serve in the local military units.  
With them, they brought their language (Low German, an oral language), their 
religious beliefs, their customs, and their traditional recipes.  Because Mennonite 
emigrants settled in colonies, just as they had in “the old country,” they were fairly 
isolated from external cultural influences.  Consequently, many of the old ways have 
been preserved.  I represent the first generation in my family that no longer speaks 
Low German. As a child, however, my grandparents taught me about the Mennonite 
beliefs, and my paternal grandmother passed along to me the many recipes that were 
prepared by my ancestors. These recipes were accompanied by stories of previous 
generations and their lives, first in the Netherlands and Germany, and then in 
Ukraine, Poland, and Russia.   
Great Granny’s “Peppernuts” 
4 c corn syrup   3 tsp. cloves 
2 c sugar   3 tsp. ginger 
3 eggs    3 tsp. allspice 
1 tsp. baking soda  3 tsp. nutmeg 
2 Tbs. cinnamon  ½ Tbs. baking powder 
Combine above ingredients and mix in as much flour as possible.  Roll into ropes, 
cut into segments approximately ½ inch square, and roll in palm of hand. Place on 
ungreased cookie sheets and bake at  
400 F for 10 minutes. 
In the old country, these hard little cookies were eaten instead of candy.  They have 
no butter or lard and so they could be carried in the pockets with no risk of staining 
one’s clothing.  Because they have no oil or fat, they also do not go rancid.  You can 
eat a peppernut made a year ago, and it will taste as good as the day it was baked.   
My biological father (with whom I have no contact) and mother were and are 
not practicing Mennonites.  Rather, they were part of the Canadian version of the 
hippie movement. Within months of my birth, we moved from Regina to live in an 
abandoned church in a Saskatchewan hamlet. My mother hauled water from a well, 
while trying to avoid the snakes that curled up on the front steps (and which 
frequently chased mice across our floors, driving my mother atop counters and 
furniture until they had passed). From my mother in particular, I learned an odd 
combination of values.  The first set of values reflects her own strict upbringing: I 
was expected to be well-mannered, well-spoken, and respectful of my elders; to 
possess a sound work ethic; and to demonstrate integrity in everything that I do. The 
second set of values reflects the unstable Canadian political environment of the 
1960’s and 1970’s.  My mother encouraged me to question authority, to think 
critically about ideas that are presumed to be unquestionable, to treat all people 
equitably (in a 1970’s, multicultural way, a distinction that I will address later on), 
and to challenge prevailing gender stereotypes.  It was not long before I realized that 
these two sets of values often conflict with one another.   
I have lived most of my life in Saskatchewan and Alberta, although I lived, 
with my mother and her second partner (my dad, but not biologically), out of a 
hippie-van in Mexico and Guatemala in 1975-76.   There, we survived an earthquake 
(and its aftershocks) that eventually killed over 23,000 people.  As our Guatemalan 
friends grieved their losses, our own families in Canada frantically tried to contact us 
through the Red Cross.  We were believed to be dead.   
My dad emigrated from the Netherlands when he was nine.  In this family, 
my oma and opa (grandmother and grandfather) frequently spoke to me in Dutch.  I 
was so submersed in Dutch culture that for many years, I believed this to be my 
heritage.  I heard many stories about skating to school on the canals in the 
Netherlands and the war against the Nazis, and on Christmas Eve, I waited eagerly 
for Sinterklaas and his helpers, the Black Peters. 
When I was seven, my mother met her third partner.  He emigrated from 
China when he was seventeen, and for the year we were with him, I was deeply 
submerged in traditional Chinese culture while living in a small town of primarily 
white people.  We lived in a trailer court on the outskirts of town, near the 
overgrown ball diamond. My mother learned to grow bok choy and other vegetables 
in an abandoned plot, and I can still make a perfect pot of steamed rice using only 
my fingers to gage the ratio of rice to water.  
 Although my family is reasonably educated and well read, we have always 
been part of the Canadian “working class.” Prior to becoming a homeowner two 
years ago, I had never lived in a home that was not rented.  My mother is living with 
her fourth partner, my biological father with his fifth (or so), and my Dad is recently 
separated from his second.  I have numerous “half” sisters and brothers, most of 
whom I do not know well, and several step (and ex-step) siblings.  My childhood 
was thus tumultuous and challenging.  I moved out on my own after my grade eleven 
year, dropped out of school and worked as a nurse’s aide.  I had a daughter when I 
was eighteen, whereupon I returned to high school as a single parent, completed my 
diploma, and began university.  When I was twenty-five, my partner and I got 
married in Mexico, and shortly thereafter, I completed my Bachelor’s degree in 
English.  
And here I am. 
In the spirit of Rousseau, I shall now make a prefaced confession.  Many 
graduate students foster, to some degree or another, a belief that they do not belong 
in graduate school.  They believe that through some administrative error they have 
been accepted into a graduate program, and spend a good deal of time fretting about 
their incompetence compared to those graduate students who have legitimately 
earned a place within their department.  My confession is this: I do not see myself as 
an academic or a scholar.  While sitting in my undergraduate and graduate classes, I 
almost always felt that I had not read all of the “right” books, nor had I read the 
“right” theory, and at the same time felt my colleagues had somehow found time to 
read those books I had not managed to cover.  While I understand a fair amount of 
the jargon within the discipline, I speak and write in a less traditional style.  What is 
it about myself that validates my attempts to make a “valuable contribution” to the 
study of literature? 
The only answer that I can offer is that I am a reader.  I read voraciously and 
passionately.  I read creatively and imaginatively.  Characters in novels, plays, and 
poetry have been my dearest friends and my most fiendish foes.  I have traveled this 
world and others while curled up under an afghan with a huge mug of tea, and I have 
visited the past and the future.  I do not just read books, I live them, and the books I 
read change the way I move about in the world. When I am asked to respond to 
literature, I do so in the same manner that I read literature.  My critical response 
includes a subjective, personal, and emotional reaction.  Within the discipline of 
literature studies, we need students and instructors who are capable of understanding 
and inventing complex literary theory, but my moderate success in the university 
confirms to me that we also need readers who combine their right-from-the-gut 
reactions with their critical analyses.  Further, I am a reminder to academia that what 
we do in the ivory tower must be translatable to life outside.  Our work must not only 
have meaning to our peers down the hall, or across the campus, but must also be 
visible and useful in our communities.1   
For these reasons, I am proof that the proletariat has a right to read and 
respond to literature in our way, and more importantly, we may actually have 
something valuable to contribute to literary studies, expanding both the scholarship 
and the traditional conceptualization of a scholar.  Like the editors of The Intimate 
Critique, I am resisting the “formal distance and conventional hierarchies” of 
academic discourse, which is “logical, controlled, framed, and contained” 
(Freedman, Frey, and Zauhar 2).  Rather, I am committed to exploring my subject 
from an informal and unconventional position that, while logical, is also grounded in 
emotion and subjectivity. I propose to take risks rather than control or restrict my 
thinking, and to remove the rigid frames of conventional academic thinking in 
exchange for a method that recognizes the critic’s subjectivity as the fallible yet 
integral determinant of the project’s direction and outcome. I have also engaged with 
theory that is often highly personal, that is anecdotal, and that does not present itself 
as objective. 
I first began experimenting with writing in this manner as an undergraduate 
student, after taking a women’s and gender studies class and a feminist critical 
theory class, where I was first exposed to life writing (or rather, was first taught to 
recognize life writing). It seemed to me hypocritical to believe that when discussing 
life writers and the many ways their sense of identity consciously and 
subconsciously influences their work, I could somehow ignore how my own sense of 
identity influences my critique of those writers and their written lives. I am very 
fortunate to be working in a department whose faculty members encourage and 
facilitate such experimentation, and what was for me a “radical” way to complete an 
undergraduate essay assignment has now largely become my writing style. When I 
studied life writing theories, I learned about the two major schools of thought 
regarding the writer’s identity.  The humanists assert that the writer is “autonomous 
and unified [ . . . ] at the centre of meaning and action [ . . .] [and] a sovereign self, 
whose essential core of being transcends the outward signs of environmental and 
social conditioning” (Rice and Waugh 123). Conversely, poststructuralists refer to 
the writer as a “subject,” a term that “plays ambiguously between, on the one hand, 
subject as in the opposition subject/object, or subject as in grammar; and on the other 
hand, subject as in subject of the state, or subject to the law” (Rice and Waugh 123). 
When I write myself into an essay or a thesis chapter, I not only demonstrate that I 
bring all of my personal experiences to the academy, but I also demonstrate how the 
academy comes home with me, and alters the way that I behave in the world beyond 
the academy and interact with my community. I illustrate how, at the same time, I 
am subject and self; I am a product of my family, community, nation, and society, 
and yet I am sometimes, and ever so briefly, able to think outside of my previous 
subjectivity and effect change in my previously constituted subjectivity, and 
consequently my ways of understanding the world. And as I write myself into yet 
another project, and grunt and cry and sweat as I try to pull my academic and 
personal worlds onto the same page, I realize that I, like Daphne Marlatt, am 
“writing for [my] life” (“Self-Representation” 127).   
Have I forgotten anything significant? 
Oh yes, and I am white.  Well, truth be told, I am kind of a yellowish, olive, 
pinkish colour, and in the summer, I am very, very brown.  
But I am White. 
I first became fascinated with life writing and theories of identity as an 
undergraduate student, perhaps because my own identity seemed such a hodgepodge 
of languages, cultural practices, political and religious perspectives, and even 
geographical locations.  It was not until I was a graduate student, however, enrolled 
in a pedagogy course and reading bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress, that it 
occurred to me that part of my identity included my whiteness. Hooks challenges 
white people to “interrogate the location from which they speak” (77), and argues 
that it is “crucial that ‘whiteness’ be studied, understood, [and] discussed” (43).  My 
racial privilege (and the ignorance that so often accompanies that privilege) 
permitted me to accept whiteness as an invisible or neutral position. Since hooks 
disrupted my delusive self-perception, I have become obsessed with exploring 
whiteness in theory, in literature, and in spheres outside of the campus boundaries. 
It wasn’t long after reading hooks that I returned to a book that had deeply 
affected me, Daphne Marlatt’s Ana Historic. When I first studied the book as an 
undergraduate, I was fascinated not only by Marlatt’s investigation of 
mother/daughter relationships, lesbian identity, experimental language use, and 
patriarchal domination, but even more by her (re)writing of Canada’s colonial 
history.  Herself an immigrant, Marlatt’s understanding of the colonization of 
Canada seemed particularly fresh and acute.  While I read the book as a commentary 
on colonization, I failed to recognize that Marlatt also begins to deconstruct the 
white colonizer, past and present.  Now that I return to the book looking for 
whiteness, it is everywhere.  Although she does not use the term “whiteness,” she 
interrogates it in much of her writing. In my study of her work I will focus primarily 
upon Ana Historic, but will also draw upon her writings in Readings from the 
Labyrinth. 
I invite you, dear reader, to embark on a two-part adventure with me.  First, 
through my eyes we will explore the many and conflicting notions of race, ethnicity, 
and whiteness. We will probe the similarities and differences between whiteness 
theory, generated predominately in the United States but also significantly by the 
British theorist Richard Dyer, and whiteness as theorized in Canadian society.  We 
will then explore the writings of Daphne Marlatt, and how she consciously and 
subconsciously constructs the white identities of her characters.  As we reach the 
conclusion of our adventure, it is my hope that we will have gathered along our 
journey tools that we can use beyond the page.  
My goal is not to define whiteness succinctly, to dissect and categorize 
scientifically Marlatt’s writing, nor is it to solve the neocolonial woes of Canada. As 
a  woman who has long been deeply troubled by the racism in my homeland, I am 
eager to “take more chances on the page [. . .] to move beyond [my] private 
conversations or formal, well-thought-out positions” and to muster “the guts to risk 
speaking [my] half-formed understandings and raw emotions” (Warland 192).  In the 
halls and classes of the university, in the neighbourhood pubs, in the elementary 
schools, in the grocery stores, it seems to me that many people have stopped talking 
about race and racism, either out of fear, shame, ignorance, or apathy.  Consequently, 
the process of moving toward an antiracist Canada has been slowed.  If in the risks 
that I am willing to take—exposing my half-formed ideas, my emotions, my 
mistakes, my ignorance, my learnings, and my new understandings— my writing 
sparks conversation, debate, or even conflict, about whiteness, race, or racism in 
Canada, then I have achieved my goal. 
  
 
2. Developing a Nose for Whiteness 
  
When people inquire about my thesis work and I explain my area of interest, 
they become noticeably uncomfortable. Whiteness is often like body odour—the 
people who emit it are usually unaware of the effect of their smell on those around 
them.   If they are vaguely aware that their scent is displeasing, they seldom 
understand what causes the smell, and merely attempt to mask it with perfumes and 
deodorants.  Further, discussion of one’s body odour frequently results in 
embarrassment, confusion, denial, and shame.  Such is the nature of whiteness—
white people are seldom aware of their whiteness, seldom recognize and appreciate it 
as a social construct, and rarely notice how their whiteness affects those who do not 
share it or how it confers unearned advantage upon themselves.  Even when people 
catch the occasional whiff of their own whiteness, they are less likely to investigate 
its origins and remedies than to mask its existence, deny its potency, deflect attention 
to another person/people, or become immobilized with shame. 
When bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress challenged me to study and 
understand whiteness, I must confess that I immediately thought she was referring to 
skin colour. Yet my skin is something that I was born with, over which I have no 
control, and certainly something that cannot be studied, understood, or interrogated 
from a theoretical perspective. But she also suggested that I need to “interrogate the 
location from which [I] speak,” and I suddenly realized for the first time in my life 
that my whiteness is a location or a construction, and not merely a biologically 
determined physical characteristic. I also realized that whiteness needs to be an 
integral component in discussions about race racism.2
After reading hooks’ passage on whiteness, I walked about in shock.  How 
was it that I had never before detected my own whiteness?  Why had I never before 
encountered whiteness theory in the feminist and post-colonial literature courses that 
I had taken in university?  I concluded, in smug self-righteousness, that the answer to 
both of these questions is that the study of whiteness is relatively uncharted territory.  
Immediately obsessed, I began reading as much information as possible on the 
subject, and indeed, theorists such as Shelley Fisher Fishkin confirmed my beliefs, 
stating that the “idea of whiteness as a construct did not receive widespread attention 
until the 1990’s” (430).  Suddenly, I knew what my thesis topic would be, and I 
promptly wrote my thesis proposal, confident that I would indeed “contribute new 
understandings to the existing body of knowledge in my field.”   Not long afterward, 
while I was in the middle of researching, bell hooks again fanned the odour of 
whiteness toward my nostrils.  In Black Looks: Race and Representation, hooks 
reveals that the study of whiteness is generations old: 
Although there has never been any official body of black people in 
the United States who have gathered as anthropologists and/or 
ethnographers to study whiteness, black folks have, from slavery on, 
shared in conversations with one another “special” knowledge of 
whiteness gleaned from close scrutiny of white people.  (165)  
 
The study of whiteness then, is not new; it is new only to white people.  Further, few 
white people have even recognized themselves as racialized beings. I found it odd 
that I had never before identified, defined, or thought about my racial identity.  And 
like some of the white women interviewed by Ruth Frankenberg in White Women, 
Race Matters, my introduction to white, antiracist, and neocolonial theory was made 
not by other white women, but by women of colour (Frankenberg 176-77).   
 
2.1 Trying to Define Whiteness  
 
My exploration of whiteness begins with trying to define it: So what is 
whiteness?  Who is white? When I first asked myself these questions, they seemed 
very simple; if any part of my thesis would be unambiguous, it would be the 
definition of whiteness.  It first seemed to me that whiteness is a racial category, just 
as “Black” or “Asian” are racial categories.  In his book Social Processes, sociologist 
Tamotsu Shibutani explains: 
One of the most pernicious superstitions of our time is the prevalent 
belief that human beings are divided into different “races.”  Race is a 
popular concept that rests on false assumptions.  Anthropologists 
agree that the units they study—people who share a common genetic 
makeup—do not coincide at all with what are commonly called 
“races” of humanity.  (97) 
 
Indeed, people have always tended to organize their worlds by placing those people 
and things with which they interact into “units” or categories.  The need to create 
racial categories, however, stems from a much more sinister source than a mere 
desire for organization.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term race 
used to refer to “those of common lineage or ancestry [and] people of like coloring 
could be of different races” (Frye, The Politics of Reality 114).  It was only when 
Europeans began global exploration, exploitation, and colonization that the term race 
assumed a more “colourful” definition. New ideas of race were employed in 
conjunction with the prevailing theories of primitivist discourse and dichotomous 
hierarchy that claimed that the masculine, elite, white Westerner is superior to the 
feminine, working class, non-white non-Westerner (Downe).  Frankenberg and many 
other whiteness theorists emphasize the importance of acknowledging colonialism 
and imperialism as the mother and father of the contemporary North American white 
identity.   The colonizers believed that the people they were ravaging were less than 
human, thereby justifying the act of colonialism and never questioning its 
inhumanity.  Based upon unsubstantiated biological “evidence,” the white 
conquerors constructed a racial hierarchy that placed Caucasians at the top, and 
every other non-white group below them.  Any non-Caucasian group was found 
“savage,” “uncivilized,” or less evolved.  Colonial reasoning then deduced that those 
savage people needed to be governed, converted to Christianity, carried up the 
evolutionary ladder to civilization as the white man’s burden, and that their “unused” 
land and resources should be appropriated so that those resources would better serve 
humanity (or at the very least, the colonizing country).  It is upon this belief in 
clearly identifiable racial groups and their biologically predetermined characteristics 
that contemporary racism is founded.  Yet Candace West and Sarah Fenstermaker 
assert: 
There are no biological criteria (e.g. hormonal, chromosomal, or 
anatomical) that allow physicians to pronounce race assignment at 
birth, thereby sorting human beings into distinctive categories [. . .]. 
As in the case of sex characteristics, appearances are treated as if they 
were indicative of some underlying state.  (376) 
Thus, the assumption that whiteness is a biological racial category is complicated.3 
Race is not biological, but as Gayle Wald explains, “is itself a narrative” (192).  I 
particularly enjoy Wald’s description of race because the metaphor reminds me that 
like a narrative, whiteness is created or constructed and plotted by people.  Frye and 
others often critique masculinity, explaining: “maleness we have construed as 
something a human animal can be born with; masculinity we have construed as 
something a human animal can be trained to” (Willful Virgin 151). Whiteness, she 
argues, is like masculinity in that it is constructed. So my “white” skin colour is 
something with which I was born, but my whiteness is something that I have (often 
unwittingly) learned and performed.4 Whiteness is also similar to masculinity in that 
Western culture encourages us to assume it as the norm, to leave it unchallenged, 
unquestioned, and even unrecognized.  Adrienne Rich describes this practice as 
“white solipsism” which is the tendency to “think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness 
described the world” (qtd. in Spelman 116).  
To define whiteness, then, is a challenging prospect; how does one begin to 
define something that for many simply does not exist beyond an insignificant 
designation of skin colour? In this regard, whiteness, as Mike Hill succinctly phrases 
it, “is sneaky” (“A Symposium on Whiteness” 115).  Marilyn Frye assumes this 
challenge, often under the advisement of women of colour, and highlights some key 
characteristics of whiteness.  Frye believes that white people consider themselves as 
“benevolent and good-willed, fair, honest and ethical” (WV 154), and that authority 
and whiteness are closely enmeshed (WV 156).  This self-image, however 
subconscious, clearly echoes the beliefs conveyed in colonial racial hierarchies: 
white people are good, and white people should therefore be or assume authority 
because then everything they touch will also be good (and fair and honest and 
ethical). Peggy McIntosh elaborates upon white identity, recognizing that “whites are 
taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and average, and also 
ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen as work that will allow 
‘them’ to be more like ‘us’”(32).  A tension is created: on the one hand, whiteness 
tries to be invisible and unnoticed, while on the other, whiteness wants to be the 
standard for which all others are to strive, necessitating its recognition, at least on the 
part of some. Another tension is created because while all of those within Western 
society are supposed to strive to embody whiteness, very few are actually deemed 
acceptably white. For all its presumed benevolence and goodwill, whiteness is a 
gatekeeper and herein lies the key to understanding whiteness: more than anything, 
whiteness is first about comparison, and then about power. 
 
2.2 White by Comparison 
 
My dad is, among other things, a painter.  I remember when I was a child 
watching him work in his studio, and he explained the colour wheel and colour 
theory.  “White,” he said, “is not a colour.  White is the absence of colour.”  In 
Frankenberg’s interviews with white women, the same concept is used to 
characterize whiteness, for the women said of themselves that they “‘did not have a 
culture’” (192).  In her analysis, Frankenberg argues that “a far-reaching danger of 
whiteness coded as “no culture” is that it leaves in place whiteness as defining a set 
of normative cultural practices against which all are measured and into which all are 
expected to fit” (204).  A corollary of this argument is that if whiteness has no 
culture, or is normative, then everything that is not white is then cultural or foreign 
or exotic, and outside of the norm.  Such definitions of what is white (and what is 
not) are limiting and binary, and do not acknowledge the many locations of 
intersection and interplay amongst varying racial, cultural, and ethnic constructions.   
I turned to the internet to corroborate my dad’s definition of the colour white, 
and what I discovered was a subtle, yet crucial difference in definitions.  On the 
Sanford website, the colour white is defined not as the absence of colour, but 
actually a reflection of all colours.5  How accurately does this definition apply to 
whiteness theory?  If white is a reflection of all colours, then whiteness needs to 
construct other racial categories to exist. To varying degrees, the theorists of 
whiteness agree with this assertion.  Sherene Razack refers to “interlocking systems 
of domination” (12); Frankenberg believes whiteness to be a “relational category” 
(231); and West and Fenstermaker assert that racial identity is not a trait but 
“something that is accomplished in interaction with others” (372). Each theorist 
employs language which points to the humanly fabricated (and not biologically 
determined) nature of whiteness; “systems,” “categories,” and “[something] 
accomplished” are all results of social human activity.  Nature, as I learned in first-
year biology, is always moving towards entropy or chaos. The world only begins to 
assume an “organized” appearance (and, of course, this is a statement laden with 
Western thinking and values) when humans begin to impose “systems” and 
“categories” into which all things might be placed.6  Further, to create categories, 
one must compare various items to one another, thereby determining which are 
similar, which are different, and to what degree.   
Whiteness as white people experience it, then, may be an absence of culture, 
but the construction of whiteness has been dependent upon its comparison to other 
perceived racial groups.  Shelley Fisher Fishkin contends that, historically, white 
writers have “constructed versions of their own identity [. . .] by defining themselves 
as unlike various racial and ethnic ‘others’” (432).  This understanding of white self-
definition is much like the Sanford definition of the colour white; the white object 
reflects, in the sense of appears to emit or send away from itself, all other colours to 
exist, rather than existing independent of all others.  Whiteness, the construction, 
requires one or many “contrast colours” to be visible, and those contrast colours 
must be dark and evil and godless and hypersexual and possess innumerable other 
“bad” characteristics so that whiteness may indeed appear bright and pure and holy 
and innocent in comparison.  Again, I have replicated a common binary in my 
argument; whites are compared with non-whites, thereby essentializing each group.  
White becomes a homogenous category, and all those who do not qualify as “white” 
become, quite simply, “non-white.”  This is an idea I will return to in my discussion 
of Canadian whiteness.   
First, however, I must explore the second part of a statement I made earlier, 
that whiteness is about comparison, and also about power. As previously argued, 
whiteness as a social construction really began to take form in concert with global 
exploration and colonization. Susan Jacob, in her essay “Sharers in a Common Hell: 
The Colonial Text in Schreiner, Conrad, and Lessing,” asserts that “to affirm his 
[sic] superior culture it became necessary for the colonizer to denigrate that of the 
[N]ative [sic] to see it as different and inferior” (84).  Colonizers compared their 
“superior” culture to that of the “inferior” Native, and in doing so defined their 
relationship and the respective statuses in that relationship. And when colonizers 
identified “the Native” as a savage, a slave, or a barbarian, thereby classifying the 
non-white as a subspecies to (white) humans, their act of naming or classification 
was an assertion of power.7 The colonizers claim power in another, less obvious, 
manner during the act of naming, for while they name “the Native,” they do not 
name themselves.  That the colonizers can ignore their own race or racial 
construction is in itself an act of white privilege.  Because the colonizers and 
neocolonizers have never had to scrutinize their whiteness, they have also never had 
to “acknowledge [their whiteness] as an organizing principle in social and cultural 
relations” (George Lipsitz qtd. in Fisher Fishkin 429-30).   
 
2.3 Power and Privilege 
 
The question that leads logically from Lipsitz’ quotation is What is the role of 
whiteness in the organization of social and cultural relations?  In part, I have 
answered this question: in the Western world, whites are responsible for having 
established a social organization that places those who perform whiteness well in 
positions of power, while attempting to place in subordinate positions all of those 
who are not white or those who do/will not enact whiteness.  Sherene Razack points 
out that “responses to subordinate groups are socially organized to sustain existing 
power arrangements” (8).  Discussions of colonialism frequently focus on the 
historical events that involved one group colonizing another group and their land.  
More recent theories tend to acknowledge, as does Razack, what Frankenberg 
defines as “ongoing neocolonial relations” as a more accurate description of 
contemporary race relations (238). Marlatt herself warns that “presuming to speak 
from a ‘post’ position blinds us to the fact that things haven’t really changed that 
much” (Carr 105). White colonialism and the scramble for social dominance are not 
ideas of the past but, rather, are ongoing dilemmas on both personal and systemic 
levels. 
McIntosh, author of “White Privilege and Male Privilege,” addresses the 
issue of white power by employing the metaphor of a backpack.  She explains that 
“white privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, 
assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, 
emergency gear, and blank checks” (31). McIntosh qualifies her use of the definition 
of white privilege, however, arguing that the term privilege is misleading because it 
implies a “favored state,” when in the case of white privilege, what she seeks to 
describe are “conferred dominance” and “unearned advantages.” She further clarifies 
her position by stipulating that even if whites enjoy conferred power, this privilege 
does not “confer moral strength” (as many assume), and that many marginalized 
groups have “actually become strong through not having all these unearned 
advantages [. . .] Members of so-called privileged groups can seem foolish, 
ridiculous, infantile, or dangerous” (35-36).  McIntosh succeeds in reversing the 
powerful/powerless binary by pointing out that those who hold unearned power are 
not implicitly moral or superior, nor is their power absolute. Because whites view 
themselves as the morally superior group does not mean that those outside whiteness 
view them in the same way. 
A girlfriend of mine and I first met in a creative writing class in the summer.  
During a break, we began talking and realized that our histories were very similar in 
some ways: we were both from poor families, from small communities, were parents 
of young children, had completed at least part of our education as single parents, 
were survivors of childhood sexual assault, had had “bad” relationships, and yet 
here we both were, on the road to “success.”  Boy, had we overcome some 
impossible odds and thrown “the statistics” all out of whack.   
  But in addition to our shared narrative, our stories also diverged.  When she 
hit a rough patch in her early to mid teens and started to miss school, the principal 
of her school drove to her home and told her that she shouldn’t bother coming back.  
She was part “Indian,” after all, so really, what was the point of wasting everyone’s 
time when she was just going to “drop out anyway?”  When I hit similar rough 
patches, every effort was made on the part of teachers, administrators, and social 
agencies, to make sure that I wasn’t lost. 
We were both bright, creative, talented, loving women.  The difference was 
that I had an invisible knapsack, and she didn’t.  
 
2.4 One or Many Identities? 
 
To this point, I have been talking about whiteness as if it is a singular and 
unified entity or phenomenon, but this is an assumption that must also be 
interrogated.  Is whiteness the same, regardless of age, gender, sexuality, or 
geographical location?  When I first began looking for theories of whiteness, I 
discovered that most whiteness theorists are American.  As I read their work, I found 
myself frequently jotting argumentative notes in the margins; often, I felt that either 
personally, provincially, or nationally, the theories did not represent the 
constructions of whiteness with which I am familiar. 8  Simply from a historical 
perspective, the United States and Canada are remarkably different.  Indeed, while 
the colonization of the territory that was to become the States involved genocide and 
control of the Aboriginal population, it also relied heavily upon the slave trade and 
industry of those slaves, making Aboriginals even more invisible in American 
history.9  Consequently, whiteness studies generated in the States tend to focus 
primarily on historical and current relationships between blacks and whites. Another 
consideration when thinking about American whiteness is that many Americans 
embrace a “melting pot” philosophy in regard to race relations (race, ethnicity, and 
culture are pooled into an American identity that, in theory, is shared by all 
American citizens).  Canada, the nation, rather than being based on an extensive 
history of slave trading, was initially built significantly upon the relationship 
between the colonizers and the Aboriginal Canadian populations, though official 
histories most often conceal this feature of the nation’s past. Further along in the 
colonization process, the relationship between whites and other ethnic groups also 
become important, as colonists had to “import” huge numbers of people from various 
ethnic groups to be used as cheap labourers and to populate the country (Steinberg 5-
6).  Canada became a country governed primarily by white, English- or French- 
speaking men, yet populated by displaced First Nations people and large 
communities of Ukrainian, German, Japanese, Polish, Italian, Irish, Chinese, and 
numerous other ethnic groups, both men and women, who were seen as less white 
than the English or French. 
In the 1960s, the Canadian French petitioned the government for equal status 
with the English, resulting in a Royal Commission whose mandate was to “inquire 
into and report on the state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada” (Kallen 
170).  This commission “supported policy changes designed to entrench a Canada-
wide policy based on an ideal of cultural dualism,” resulting in an outcry from the 
non-English and non-French Canadians who demanded recognition in the new policy 
(Kallen 171).  In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau established a multicultural 
policy, emphasizing that “the preservation of cultural distinctiveness and of ethnic 
ties and identities, by individuals or groups, was to be a voluntary and private 
matter” (Kallen 172).  In 1988, Canada officially adopted the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act to deal with the numerous ethnic and cultural groups living 
within its borders (Ng, Anti-racism xiii).  It differed from the policy in that it made 
reference to “racial, as well as cultural equality,” to non-official as well as official 
languages, and included mention of Aboriginal peoples (Kallen 176).  
A multicultural society is one that “celebrat[es] visual ‘ethnic’ and ‘cultural’ 
differences” (thus theoretically valuing each group equally), yet anti-racists like 
Roxana Ng charge that a multicultural society fails to examine how these differences 
are produced (Antiracism xiii).  M. Nourbese Philip sharply criticizes the 
multicultural trend as something that “pretends to be what it is not—a mechanism to 
equalize all cultures within Canada” (Frontiers 181).  Canadian multiculturalism was 
(and is) an attempt by policy makers to make equal all the cultural groups in Canada, 
yet Canada still officially privileges only two language groups.  By adopting a 
multicultural policy, the Canadian government appeared to treat racial issues in a 
progressive and liberal manner, yet multicultural policy actually allowed those 
responsible for the “differences produced” (constructed) to continue to occupy 
positions of unearned power and advantage.   
While Canadians “celebrate their differences” in kindergarten classes and 
multicultural festivals, they are supposed to ignore or forget the history of 
colonization, exploitation, and racism that resulted in the creation of a social 
hierarchy in Canada (and thanks to multicultural education in elementary and high 
schools, students today do not learn about this history to begin with, so they need not 
strain themselves to pretend that history does not exist).  Simultaneously, 
multiculturalism encourages people to emphasize, in a decontexualized form, for 
example, the very customs, religious beliefs, foods, and manners of dress, that 
identify them as not being entirely “white” (that is, without culture), which is, as 
some assert, synonymous with being Canadian.  Philip states “‘Canadian’ means 
dominant white group surrounded by microcultures, some of which are brown, black 
or yellow” (Frontiers 155).  Marnina Gonick narrows this definition even further, 
based upon her interaction with non-white Canadian children, arguing that 
“Canadian=blonde, English, [and] white”, as she reveals in her essay by the same 
title.  What becomes evident to me is a large gap between multiculturalism as 
“official” policy, and multiculturalism as it is experienced by the people who live in 
this country. 
Philips’ and Gonick’s words follow me about for days.  I think about all my 
years in the public school system.  Peer groups were always formed based upon 
visual differences.  In my elementary school, those who appeared “Asian” (not 
actually  a homogenous group, but rather extremely diverse, ranging culturally, from 
Laotian to Vietnamese to Chinese) constituted one group, the Aboriginal students 
another, and the white children comprised a third, clearly defined group.  Our 
multicultural education had not taught us-- (most pointedly, the white students) to 
“embrace our differences”; what we were taught was how to identify differences, 
how to exclude some children based upon these differences, and finally, how to see 
those people as different from ourselves-- and not that we might be different from 
them (referring back to the fundamental belief of whiteness, that it is the norm from 
which all others deviate).  And of course, multiculturalism, in part, taught us to look 
for differences in the first place. 
Certainly, multiculturalism, as opposed to assimilation or a “melting” pot, 
affects the way in which white and non-white groups interact with one another. What 
interests me equally, however, is whether multiculturalism affects the ways in which 
whites interact with one another.  Is Canadian whiteness different than American (or 
European) whiteness because of multiculturalism, which should encourage us to 
distinguish amongst the various white ethnic groups and not just amongst those who 
are visibly “different”?  This question is one of the first that came to mind when I 
first began thinking about whiteness. I believed that the cultural influences I 
experienced while growing up made me considerably different from many of my 
white peers.  Our stories of the old country, our recipes, our cultural practices that 
had been handed down made me different from an Irish Canadian, or a Ukrainian 
Canadian, for example.  These cultural relics, so fragile now and so gingerly handed 
down from generation to generation, also remind me that part of me is an immigrant, 
an outsider, a foreigner, and a colonizer, even though I was born on the 
Saskatchewan prairies.   
 I think that there are very distinct differences between white people, 
including ethnicity, that determine their place in the Canadian social hierarchy. It is 
important to acknowledge these differences or risk discounting the multitude of 
experiences and the knowledge amassed by white Canadians.  Laura Donaldson, in 
her introduction to Decolonizing Feminisms, warns against (amongst other things)  
meld[ing] all white women together into undifferentiated economic 
and sexual categories and [ . . .] ignor[ing] the social stratifications 
that divide white women from each other as well as from women of 
color. Such a homogenous stance also fails to perceive how women 
who enjoy privileges accorded to middleclass whiteness can 
simultaneously experience sexual oppression. (2) 
Donaldson already distinguishes between the white male and the white female 
experience and implicitly between white middleclass females and white females of 
other classes, but extends the differences among whites beyond gender and class.  
One branch of distinction that can be made amongst Canadian whites is that of 
ethnicity. In early Canadian texts, such as Susanna Moodie’s Roughing It in the 
Bush, the Canadian settlers paid close attention to their neighbours’ land of origin.  
Those who were American, or Irish, or Italian were often less respected than those of 
English descent.10 Such distinctions are prevalent today, even if they do not manifest 
themselves in the same manner.  Derogatory terms, jokes, and stereotypes exist for 
nearly every ethnic group, including those that are white.11 Clearly, some whites 
perceive that there are culturally or religiously-based differences within the larger 
group, justifying micro-categories within the macro-category of whiteness.  
Frankenberg argues that similar, though seemingly more dramatic, dynamics are 
evident in the United States; there, whites who identify with an ethnicity become 
“not really white” and “not really American” (202).  
One’s ethnicity is not the only characteristic causing one to be demoted 
within, refused access to, or ousted from the inner circle of the “white club”; any one 
of these penalties can occur based on any number of infractions (graduations of skin 
colour, religious beliefs, physical or mental disabilities, atypical sexuality, low 
economic status, or a refusal to espouse fundamental beliefs that support white 
supremacy). Dyer summarizes: 
White as a skin colour is just as unstable, unbounded a category as 
white as a hue, and therein lies its strength.  It enables whiteness to be 
presented as an apparently attainable, flexible, varied category, while 
setting up an always moveable criterion of inclusion. (57)   
As previously mentioned, my childhood home was literate but economically 
disadvantaged. Looking back, I think that my working-class status, more than any 
other factor, made me feel excluded by many of my white peers.  Theorists such as 
Matt Wray, Annalee Newitz, and Constance Penley have studied whiteness from an 
economic perspective and assert that “white trash” are perhaps the only whites who 
are cognizant of their racial identities.  In their introduction to White Trash: Race 
and Class in America, editors Wray and Newitz reveal: 
Because white trash is, for whites, the most visible and clearly marked 
form of whiteness, it can perhaps help to make all whites self-
conscious of themselves as a racial and classed group [. . .]. White 
trash have the potential to perform the work of racial self-recognition 
and self-consciousness that bell hooks has found absent in dominant 
forms of whiteness. (4-5) 
Perhaps the economic circumstances in my childhood formed that part of my 
consciousness that has always been (in varying degrees of awareness) concerned 
with social inequalities and processes of marginalization.  Caroline Heilbrun, in 
Women’s Lives: A View from the Threshold, quotes Rosemary Reuther who wrote, 
“‘It is almost impossible for an individual alone to dissent from this culture.  
Alternate cultures and communities must be built up to support the dissenting 
consciousness’” (34).  My Mennonite heritage, linguistically, religiously, and 
culturally, has never been blatantly apparent to those with whom I interact.  
However, I have never been able to hide my relative poverty, and so I identified with 
an “alternate community.”  When my grade school friends sported the latest 
fashions, ate designer lunches, and rode shiny new bicycles, I rode to school on a 
used bike, wearing second-hand or homemade clothing, in rubber boots so full of 
holes that I wore bread bags on my feet to keep them dry, and ate a filling and 
nutritious (but very uncool) lunch of cheese sandwiches and fruit. I was decidedly 
not part of the “in group”.  The “invisibility” supposedly so inherent in my whiteness 
was not there; I was visible and vulnerable to other whites in some of the ways 
experienced by non-white peers.  
 The economically disadvantaged white, like the ethnicized white, or such 
whites as the disabled, the homosexual white, or the Jewish white, or the audible 
minority, must be identified as unsuccessfully white by the hegemonic white 
population because to include these people in the inner sanctum of whiteness would 
be to acknowledge “weakness,” fallibility, or vulnerability—an Achilles’ heel—
thereby disrupting the illusion that whites are superior on all levels and in all areas. 
Indeed, in describing the state of white colonization in early 20th-century Africa, 
Katherine Fishburn shrewdly notes that “colonizers must maintain absolute vigilance 
over each other, even to the point, where need be, of sacrificing the weakest 
members” (3).  Contemporary whiteness still follows a “one-drop rule” of sorts, as 
described by Valerie Babb in The Meaning of Whiteness.  She explains: 
Formed during the era of slavery and cemented during the Jim Crow 
era, this “rule” defined anyone having black ancestry, however remote 
or difficult to document, as “black.”  The “one-drop rule” was 
distinctly North American.  In other cultures, being white was 
conceived of as more of a social status.  (180) 
The “one-drop rule” protected white society from any possible “contamination” from 
a non-white gene pool; today, however, white society not only tries to segregate 
those whose “racial” contributions may disrupt its “purity,” but also social, political, 
sexual, religious, and other influences that may taint its attempts to portray itself as a 
homogenous and superior population.    
Therefore, those who inhabit white skin but who possess characteristics 
(either deliberately or involuntarily) that do not aid in the perpetuation of the white 
dream of superiority and are cast to the periphery, may view white society from an 
alternative (and more critical) position. But just because “white trash have the 
potential to perform the work of racial self-recognition and self-consciousness,” it 
does not follow that they will do so (emphasis mine).  While the marginalizing 
experience of living as white trash, for example, has the promise of connecting a 
segment of the white population with others who have been marginalized for 
different reasons, the realization of the promise is not a foregone conclusion.  
Constance Penley notes of American culture: 
If you are white trash, then you must engage in the never-ending 
labor of distinguishing yourself, codifying your behavior so as to 
signify a difference from blackness that will, in spite of everything, 
express some miniscule, if pathetic, measure of your culture’s 
superiority, at least to those above you who use the epithet “white 
trash” to emphasize just how beyond the pale you are. (90) 
Even those who do not reap all the benefits of mainstream whiteness may still 
struggle to be identified with that group (or rather, struggle not to be identified with 
non-white groups).  Further, even from the outer borders of whiteness, the 
marginalized whites in their complex and intersecting identities still contribute to 
whiteness as a whole.  Marilyn Frye explains: 
The white girl learns that whiteliness12 is dignity and respectability; 
she learns that whiteliness is her aptitude for partnership with white 
men; she learns that partnership with white men is her salvation from 
the original position of Woman in patriarchy.  Adopting and 
cultivating whiteliness as an individual character seems to put it in the 
woman’s own power to lever herself up out of a kind of nonbeing (the 
status of woman in a male supremacist social order) over into a kind 
of Being (the status of white in white supremacist social order).  But 
whiteliness does not save white women from the condition of woman. 
Quite the contrary.  A white woman’s whiteliness is deeply involved 
in her oppression as a woman and works against her liberation. [. . .] 
[W]hite men may welcome our whiteliness as endorsement of their 
own values and as an expression of our loyalty to them. (Willful 
Virgin 160-61) 
Frye contends that women (and I would add other marginalized, but white groups) 
are categorized as “nonbeings” until they adopt and “cultivate” whiteness: until a 
white, but marginalized, person exudes whiteness, she is entirely invisible to the 
patriarchy as a desirable object.  Those who occupy alternative spaces have very real 
lives with very real experiences, but they are largely discounted and ignored by the 
hegemonic white patriarchy.  Frye illuminates the multiplicity of people’s identities, 
and reveals how those on the margins still contribute to the greater social 
phenomenon of whiteness.  Her description of being white but also woman (two 
positions of varying power and privilege) begins to describe the many intersections 
of white peoples’ experiences.   One never has only a one dimensional identity, and 
these dimensions of identity sometimes complement and sometimes conflict with 
one another.  One can be both powerful and privileged in one aspect of one’s identity 
while simultaneously experiencing oppression and discrimination in another.  
Second, when Frye describes white women embodying whiteness and joining in 
personal partnerships with men, thereby “endors[ing] their own [patriarchal] values,” 
a stronger light is shed on Penley’s assertion that being white trash (or, presumably, 
from another marginalized group) can result in a “never-ending labor of 
distinguishing [oneself].”  The person on the margin, by “codifying” his or her 
behaviour to prove some degree of whiteness, endorses whiteness itself by treating it 
as a desirable goal to be attained, rather than a self-delusional, exclusionary, and 
discriminatory end.   
 2.5 Whiteness from the “Outside” 
  
It appears to me then, that there are shades of whiteness: variations among 
white people determine that they are not a homogeneous mass, but rather have 
innumerable permutations of identities and relative powers and privileges.   But how 
is whiteness experienced by those outside of it?  From my own position as a white 
woman within a white-privileged culture who has read the opinions of, and discussed 
with, non-white Canadians, I imagine that the various intricacies and complexities of 
whiteness are far less apparent --or more appropriately, far less important--to one 
experiencing the negative effects of whiteness.  Whether my great-grandparents 
came from Germany or Poland will not significantly effect my interaction with a 
non-white person.  A metaphor, then, is the best way for me to describe my 
understanding of whiteness.  Whiteness is like a human body that in its entirety as an 
organism affects its environment. In this manner, whiteness affects those who 
experience it: some may feel they are being acted upon by a monolithic entity.  Some 
people outside the “body” of whiteness may see through its skin to the inner 
workings, to the individuals who comprise the white construction. But the human 
body is also made up of systems of organs and nerves and blood and cells that each 
constitute a separate functioning unit.  If a pancreatic cell had a consciousness, I do 
not think it would be aware of what was being experienced by a cell of the right big 
toe.  In this manner, whiteness is not a single, homogenous construction, but it is a 
conglomerate of disparate systems, a conglomerate that works together, ultimately, 
(and whether known or unknown by the smaller units and systems) for the survival 
of the body as a whole.13
Recently, my partner and I bought an old character home in a rough 
neighbourhood.  Although the neighbourhood is situated on the riverbank (typically 
prime real estate), our community is considered “inner city,” and is feared and 
avoided by many people.  The area is one of the older ones in Saskatoon, so the 
streets are canopied by hundred year-old elms, and many of the homes are once-
magnificent two and three story character homes. The community members are, to a 
large extent, low and fixed income families.  Nearly every house has at least one 
guard dog, and the sidewalks almost always yield some evidence of crime: spattered 
blood drops from a domestic fight, discarded condoms from the sex trade workers 
who frequent the strip two blocks away, uncapped syringes, and graffiti-emptied 
aerosol cans.  Children run ill-clothed late into the night, riding too-big bikes and 
throwing rocks at garbage cans.  Our street gutters are filled with trash, in part 
because people who walk through our neighbourhood don’t care about tossing their 
litter on the ground, but also because the city street cleaners never seem to make it 
over here from the suburban areas. 14
 I won’t lie to you; when we first moved into our home, I was uneasy about the 
neighbourhood, not because most of my neighbours are non-white, not because of 
the obvious poverty, but because of the stereotypes about my neighbourhood 
perpetuated by those outside the community, stereotypes which, for all my thinking 
on the topic, I had internalized.  I had been taught to fear this community long before 
we ever bought our house.  When we were applying for our home insurance to 
accompany our mortgage, we soon discovered that no insurance company in the city 
would insure in this area, other than the provincial, government- run insurance 
company (and we had to pay higher premiums). Yet since moving in, we have found 
our neighbours to be friendly, always willing to offer a hand, and we have never 
experienced a break-in, vandalism, or violence.   
 But having read Dyer’s and hooks’ comments, I have to wonder if I haven’t 
evoked fear in my neighbours.  Physically, I am not very imposing, so I doubt that 
anyone would consider me a physical threat, but I don’t think that this is to what 
Dyer and hooks are referring when they acknowledge “white terror”/ “terrorizing.”  
From someone such as myself, white terror might manifest in a condescending air, 
overt and subtle racist comments and behaviour, or (but not limited to) a complicit 
cooperation with institutional forces that prove to be both socially and physically 
terrorizing (public education system, city police force currently under scrutiny for 
the freezing deaths of aboriginal men, justice system, etcetera).  Does the Native girl 
down the block cast furtive sideways glances at me as I walk by because I am part of 
a white terror that has already affected her life?15
 
2.6 Discovering Whiteness and Responsibility 
  
Whiteness, then, while certainly connected to one’s skin tone, is far more 
complex.  To scratch only the surface, whiteness is about perception, power, 
privilege, racism, discrimination, and presumed moral righteousness.  While the 
white skin of whiteness is a biological factor that can never be changed, the ideology 
of whiteness is not.  Frye, in the “White Woman Feminist,” remarks, 
it is seeming to me that race (together with racism and race privilege) 
is apparently constructed as something inescapable.  And it makes 
sense that it would be, since such a construction would best serve 
those served by race and racism.  Of course race and racism are 
impossible to escape; of course a white person is always in the sticky 
web of privilege that permits only acts which reinforce (“reinscribe”) 
racism.  This just means that some exit must be forced.  That will 
require conceptual creativity, and perhaps conceptual violence. (150-
51) 
If the concepts of race and racial difference are socially constructed, then so too must 
be the racial categories such as whiteness, and the solutions to the inequities created 
by these constructions.  The OED defines construction as “a thing constructed [. . . ] 
a formation of the mind” (880).  “A thing constructed” and “a formation of the mind” 
are things that can be deconstructed (and destructed) and unformed; these things, 
then, are not inescapable.  Yet I concur with Frye that whiteness and its by-products, 
racism and race privilege, are not easily escaped. Gayatri Spivak warns that “one 
cannot of course ‘choose’ to step out of ideology.  The most responsible ‘choice’ 
seems to be to know it as best one can, recognize it as best one can, and, through 
one’s necessarily inadequate interpretation, to work to change it” (“The Politics of 
Interpretation” 120).  I’ve paused on the word responsible every time I’ve reread this 
note, for it is the singular word that describes the role—my role—in researching, 
working with, and writing about whiteness.  I have spent thirty years living with 
unearned privilege when many others have not.  I have spent thirty years 
contributing to the perpetuation of whiteness, and now that the inky net of so many 
writers has been flung over its invisible but massive shape, I have been made “newly 
accountable” (McIntosh 31). So many of the whiteness theorists whom I have read 
have spoken from a very personal, rather than objectively academic position, and 
always the words responsibility and accountability are part of what they have to say.  
Sherene Razack speaks of her own “racial” awareness most eloquently: 
My goal is to move towards accountability, a process that begins with 
a recognition that we are implicated in systems of oppression that 
profoundly structure our understanding of one another.  That is, we 
come to know and perform ourselves in ways that reproduce social 
hierarchies.  Tracing our complicity in these systems requires that we 
shed notions of mastering differences, abandoning the idea that 
differences are pre-given, knowable, and existing in a social and 
historical vacuum.  Instead, we invest our energies in exploring the 
histories, social relations, and conditions that structure groups 
unequally in relation to one another and that shape what can be 
known, thought, and said.  (10) 
While white accountability must be struggled with in the most personal and private 
corners of an individual’s psyche, there is also work to be done, simultaneously, in a 
more public manner.  As a white Canadian, I have a responsibility to address the 
racism in my country; as a student of Canadian literature, I have a responsibility to 
“trace our complicity in these systems of oppression” and I am morally compelled to 
“invest my energies in exploring the histories and social relations” in Canadian and 
other) literature that both reflect and often perpetuate “conditions that structure 
groups unequally.”  The literature produced in Canada is a direct reflection (and 
often, reproduction) of the social systems and hierarchies at work in our country. 
 There is a process, to use Razack’s term, one goes through during, before, 
and after recognizing, interrogating, and trying to undo whiteness, and as I have 
learned, it is---well, the process is many things.  Because one cannot become aware 
of whiteness and then become “newly accountable” on only a personal level, or only 
a public level—because this process, if genuine, necessitates change in all facets of 
one’s life—such awareness is both intellectually, but also emotionally and 
spiritually, draining and invigorating.  For these reasons, I think, so many of the 
theorists abandon their often “objective” and jargon-laden language for one that tries 
to capture and reflect the inner revolution they have experienced.  Such writings are 
filled with emotional anecdotes, confessions, and stumblings that try to convey their 
experiences.  Acknowledging this process is important to me in the context of my 
project: white readers need to identify where the theorists, the writer of this project 
(myself), the author of the novel to be examined (Daphne Marlatt), and the 
characters in the book are situated regarding their awareness of whiteness.  First, by 
identifying the almost predictable patterns inherent in the experience of whiteness 
awakening, readers are better able to interpret and employ the theoretical writing on 
the subject.  Shortly after whiteness theorists publish essays, I am certain that their 
understandings and thoughts often change yet again in light of new information, new 
experiences, or new global developments (such as September 11, 2001).  This was 
most certainly my experience, as I have tried to replicate briefly in the opening of 
this chapter.  Just as I felt confident that I understood the theory, I would read 
another article or have another conversation that would return my beliefs and 
assumptions to uncertainty.  I have ceased trying to reach that elusive place of 
“knowing with certainty” what I think and believe, and instead welcome the constant 
internal growth that is integral to such a project.  Having reached this point myself, I 
look at the theory surrounding the topic of whiteness with a gentler eye; yes, 
weaknesses in the arguments must be addressed or expanded upon, but the theorists 
are not talking about trochaic meter or other formal literary matters but about—in 
addition to literature and theory—their own humanity.  Then, too, we must consider 
Marlatt’s position in the process (and the work she has done to reach this point) so 
that we are able to recognize when her characters reflect her actual thinking or when, 
through their actions and words, they reflect those qualities of which she is highly 
critical. 
 The first stage in understanding one’s own whiteness comes in the shift from 
no awareness of that whiteness at all, to becoming aware that one is a racialized 
being.  Before reading bell hooks, I had no inkling that I participated in whiteness.  
People in this stage manifest their lack of awareness in many ways.  One might be an 
overt racist. One might have recognized that in our social climate, feelings of overt 
racism should be hidden under a guise of “tolerance.”16  
An acknowledgment of social inequalities and systemic discrimination draws 
one near the brink of discovering one’s whiteness, but this stage is fraught with 
intellectual and emotional hazards that jeopardize the individual’s capacity to move 
forward in the process.  Some are inclined to claim that we are all raised in a racist 
society and therefore are all, inescapably, racist; if one stops here, this is both a 
woefully pathetic and inappropriate apology for racism but also an excuse to cease 
working toward an anti-racist nation (hooks, Black Looks 14).  Others, once 
recognizing their own racist perspective, feel that the solution to the problem, as 
Frankenberg phrases it, is “color-evasiveness” (140).  People caught in this stage of 
the process try desperately to pretend (and to convince others) that they “don’t see 
colour.” While not noticing colour or “difference” is certainly well-intentioned, the 
result is inevitably the inability to recognize whiteness and how whiteness has 
shaped and does shape Canada’s social relations and hierarchies. bell hooks 
commented on her white students’ amazement that “black people watch white people 
with a critical ‘ethnographic’ gaze,’ [amazement that] is itself an expression of 
racism. [ . . .] They have a deep emotional investment in the myth of sameness” 
(Black Looks 167).  
 A component of colour-evasiveness is denial, another potential pitfall along 
the journey to white racialized self-awareness.  Gail Griffin explains that denial has 
been especially problematic in (white) feminist thinking because when white women 
try to equate their gender issues to race issues, they enable themselves to “claim 
oppression rather than the power to oppress.  As victims instead of perpetrators, they 
[can] claim innocence instead of being implicated” (12).17 Razack sarcastically 
expands on this idea, suggesting that 
with a little practice and the right information, we can all be innocent 
subjects, standing outside hierarchical social relations, who are not 
accountable for the past or implicated in the present.  It is not our 
ableism, racism, sexism, or heterosexism that gets in the way of 
communicating, but their culture, their biology, or their lifestyle.  (10)  
This denial is, as Razack terms it, a “race to innocence; a belief that we are 
uninvolved in subordinating others” (14).  Denial takes many forms, however, some 
of which will become evident as we explore Ana Historic.   
Those who have managed to move beyond excuses, colour-evasiveness, and 
denial, are still at risk of negotiating race relations from a hierarchical perspective.  
While this perspective does begin to acknowledge white responsibility in social 
inequality, its odour is that of condescension.  Razack suggests that for “white 
women, contact with non-white women reinforces the imperial idea that white 
women are more liberated than their sisters in the South.  The white woman as savior 
of less fortunate women is [. . .] a narrative that is centuries old” (5).  If the white 
critic assumes a savior position, then she focuses her attention on the “victim,” 
allowing herself to remain situated in a position of superiority, and no closer to 
grasping her own whiteness.  Ann Russo argues that “typically when we (white 
women) raise the issue of racism, we tend to focus solely on the lives and 
experiences of women of color [. . .]. As a result, working on the problem of racism 
becomes a matter of ‘helping’ these women out, as if the problem of racism were 
‘their’ problem” (299).  Perhaps it is for this reason that critics such Russo choose to 
talk about “white supremacy” rather than “racism”; the object of scrutiny is 
undoubtedly whiteness and the risk of the saviour syndrome is more likely averted as 
the critical focus is turned onto the white critic, rather than onto those “outside” of 
whiteness. 
The most painful stage for one going through “the process,” however, is that 
of guilt and/or shame.  In post-colonial writing, one frequently reads of “colonial 
guilt” that can be partially defined as an inner and often subconscious awareness of 
the violent, inequitable, and inhumane nature of colonial relations.  The colonizer 
knows, on some level, that (s)he is “in the [colonized] world but not of it” (Lessing 
qtd. in Sprague 1). Colonial guilt has carried forward into neo-colonial times as 
white Canadians, for instance, try to reconcile their compassionate self-images with 
their individual and collective contributions to racism.  Clare Holzman has worked 
hard to establish distinctions between the terms “guilt” and “shame,” and also to 
determine what function these feelings serve in antiracist work: 
Guilt is the discomfort I feel when I have done something that harms 
another person or violates a moral prohibition.  Guilt, like anxiety, is 
a signal that something is amiss and needs to be corrected. [. . .] Guilt 
tells me that I have done something wrong and need to correct it or 
make reparation.  Irrational guilt is either guilt over something I am 
not actually responsible for, or guilt whose intensity is 
disproportionate to the offense. 
Shame is what I feel when I fail to live up to my ideals for myself.  
Shame, like guilt, is a signal that prompts me to change my behavior.  
The focus is not on the harm done to others, but on the defect in 
myself.  Shame involves feelings of exposure and an impulse to hide.  
[. . .] Irrational shame is a feeling of having been exposed as a 
fundamentally and irremediably defective human being.  (326) 
I certainly experienced at least one significant bout of guilt when I became aware of 
my whiteness.  For quite a while, I wanted no part of my white and ethnic heritage.  
In the past 100 years the Germans (although not my family in particular, as far as I 
know) have been responsible for some of the most heinous acts of inhumanity in 
written history.  Once my family settled in Canada, their arrival necessarily meant 
the displacement of the First Nations people, because my family needed to farm to 
support the family.  And from the Japanese internment camps to the residential 
schools, my government (largely white) has been responsible for legislated racism.  
Surely this is a soiled legacy to which few would want to lay claim. But Holzman 
reminds us that guilt is not a useless sensation; it can “signal that something is amiss 
and needs to be corrected.”  Holzman’s definition of guilt was very useful for me at 
my time of overwhelming guilt because I was reminded that I cannot hold myself 
accountable for the actions of my ancestors; to do so would be “irrational.”  Not only 
is such guilt irrational, but it is also fruitless.  To become overwhelmed with guilt is 
to become immobilized, a stance from which no change can come.  Further, such 
guilt is self-absorbed and if indulged, selfish, because the person wallowing in guilt 
does not expect him or herself to do the work required to “correct [the problem] or 
make reparation.”  Daniel David Moses observes that guilt “sounds like the opposite 
thing to healing.  It seems that you don’t want to heal, you want to keep the wound” 
(qtd. in Egan, “Book of Jessica” 17).  To “heal the wound[s],” whites must move 
beyond irrational guilt, letting it serve as an indicator of the need for change but not 
allowing it to linger and fester.  Jean Perreault, in “White Feminist Guilt, Abject 
Scripts, and (Other) Transformative Necessities” recalls thinking about her antiracist 
work that “to do anything risks doing the wrong thing” (227).  I think Perreault 
articulates a fear that many white antiracists experience, yet only our own privilege 
and comfort can stop us from making the logical leap to realize that risking doing the 
wrong thing is better than not trying at all. 
Similarly, as I started to investigate my own whiteness, and as I became 
aware of the ways in which my language, actions, assumptions, and privileges 
contributed to a collective whiteness, I also felt shame and truly felt like a 
“fundamentally and irremediably human being.” And I am still troubled by the racist 
thoughts that flash through my head, uninvited, irrational, and yet shockingly there 
with mechanical reliability.  Richard Dyer describes similar frustration and shock in 
that despite his antiracist beliefs, racist thoughts “pop” into his head (7).  I remind 
myself, like Dyer, that these thoughts are not indicators of “who I really am” nor 
signs of my defectiveness or evilness as a human being, but rather are ideas, 
concepts, and stereotypes with which I have been bombarded since my first days on 
earth.  My mother knew a couple who, for a (cruel) lark, taught their son from birth 
terms that were opposite to what is commonly understood.  He said “down” for “up” 
and “stop” for “go.”  I cannot begin to imagine the years it took for him to “unlearn” 
these upside-down conceptual frameworks, for unlearning is always much more 
difficult than learning something new.  I imagine that as an adult, although he has 
learned to say “up” when he means “up,” that he has never managed to erase the 
conceptual framework he originally learned.  So it is with the minds of white people: 
even if they are aware that their whiteness is a construction and they resist its 
hierarchical ideologies, the framework of that construction forever remains in the 
background. Like the recovering alcoholic or anorexic, the white person is always in 
a process of recovery, and certain weaknesses from the illness can never be entirely 
purged.18  Because the white is always in a process of discovery and recovery, 
however, does not mean that (s)he is forever “bad.”  hooks teaches that as white 
people begin to address their whiteness, it is critical that they do so “without seeing 
[themselves] as bad, or all white people as bad, and all black people as good” (Black 
Looks 177).  I have had to realize that the very nature of my whiteness—an identity 
that is socially constructed—means that others have also had a part in creating who I 
am.  As Richard Dyer describes: “I did not invent racist thought, it is a part of the 
cultural non-consciousness that we all inhabit.  One must take responsibility for it, 
but that is not the same as being responsible, that is, to blame for it” (7).  This does 
not negate my personal responsibility, but it does save me from the irrational guilt 
and shame that would render further work impossible, superficial, or ineffective.19   
The focus, then, for critics, writers, and myself, is to move beyond these 
preliminary but potentially static stages of recognizing whiteness, to a proactive 
analysis of white cultural behaviour and products.  The purpose of such a focus is “to 
dislodge it [whiteness] from its centrality and authority, not to reinstate it (and much 
less, to make a show of reinstating it, when, like male power, it doesn’t actually need 
reinstating)” (Dyer 10).  While Dyer directs his critical eye toward photographic and 
other visual representations of whiteness (such as in film), I turn my critical eye to a 
novel, Ana Historic.  The objective is not to see if images of white people can be 
found in the novel, but rather, to see how Marlatt constructs the identities of her 
white characters and how those identities are mutually shaping.  I will search for 
evidence of unrealized white racial identities; the specifically Canadian historical 
context of whiteness, power, and privilege; “shades” of whiteness; whites using non-
white groups for contrast to construct their whiteness; and the various stages of 
becoming cognizant of whiteness as a racial construct.  I will, at the same time, try to 
be aware of how my experiences, identities, and subject position affect my reading 
process.   
  
 
3.  Daphne Marlatt: Her Life and Life-Writing 
 
Marlatt, as an author, with her critical theory, and her poetry and prose (life) 
writing could not be better suited to my exploration of white Canadian identity and 
its construction.  From a biographical standpoint, Marlatt has lived and does live a 
complex identity of which she is highly aware.  Her subject position is, in part and 
simultaneously, that of the writer, the immigrant, the white Canadian, and the 
lesbian.  In her critical theory she addresses (often in radical or experimental ways) 
each of these positions, providing the readers of her creative work with a myriad of 
tools with which to approach and understand her writing.  Rarely have I encountered 
an author, writing in English, who is so competent in both the critical and creative 
spheres; Marlatt’s critical work is rigorous, to use the terminology of academia, and 
yet her creative work is never bluntly didactic.  Her poetry and prose are unique in 
that Marlatt combines fiction and autobiography not by accident, but in a manner 
that is always to a high degree aware of the challenges faced when constructing 
one’s identity.  So acute and critical are Marlatt’s eye and word that each time I pick 
up my copy of Ana Historic, I chuckle to myself because beneath the title are the 
words “A Novel.”  Certainly, this labeling is not a publisher’s addition intended to 
categorize the work, but instead is Marlatt’s very conscious and somewhat wry 
description of the experimental genre contained between the front and back covers.  
Ana Historic is fictitious20 but there are many passages that are obviously 
autobiographical; by naming the work a novel, Marlatt draws attention to the fictive 
nature of recording and writing—of constructing—any person’s life or identity.21  
Daphne Marlatt was born July 11, 1942, in Australia, but spent the first years 
of her childhood in Penang, Malaysia. She immigrated with her family to Vancouver 
in 1951.  Her mother and maternal grandmother were both from a British colonial 
family and were born in India, while her father, also a British citizen, lived in India, 
Malta, Malaysia, and Australia (“Entering In” Marlatt 18-19).  Marlatt recalls that 
her parents  
referred to England as home, and yet they chose not to go home when 
they left Penang. I grew up with two nostalgias in our house: the 
nostalgia for England, which, having spent only some months there, i 
didn’t really understand; the nostalgia for Penang, which i could 
share, though it was effaced by my enthusiasm for this place here  
[. . .] I wanted to “belong,” to be “from” here but found there were 
differences not easy to bridge.  (19) 
A sense of “home,” and a desire for home when one is not there, is integral to 
Marlatt’s understanding of one’s national or regional allegiance.  In her essay 
“Entering In: The Immigrant Imagination,” Marlatt explores the part of her identity 
that is connected to her parents’ and her own sense of “home.”  The emigrant, 
Marlatt notes, is someone who is “looking back”; the emigrant mind is “rooted, 
bound up in, the place left, the ‘old country,’ ‘home’ and preoccupied with recreating 
that place, whether out of nostalgia (longing to return) or fury (that avenging spirit 
that cannot let go of old wounds)” (17).  Marlatt’s parents, although living in many 
countries but England, were emigrants because they were always looking over their 
shoulders to England as home.   
 In contrast to the emigrant, Marlatt, the immigrant, is “entering into 
something new” (“Entering In” 17).  As Marlatt reveals, however, her transition from 
Penang to Vancouver was not an easy one, and although she was prepared to 
embrace her new country, its people were not so accepting of her.  She recalls that in 
her home in Penang, five languages were spoken by her family and by the family 
servants.22 When she moved to Vancouver, however, she was struck (at that time) by 
the “monocultural,” “WASP,” and “conservative” city that was “suspicious of 
newcomers” (“Entering In” 19).  She was taunted in school because of her 
differences and so “for the sake of entry and acceptance, [she] denied for years [her] 
history and that of [her] parents” (“Entering In” 18).  For Marlatt, to enter into 
something new necessarily meant giving up or concealing (at least temporarily) 
something old.  She describes “coming to be Canadian” as a process that “involves a 
sort of amputation, a gradual loss of parts” (“Writing Our Way Through the 
Labyrinth” 36). This statement could not be more true for becoming or being a white 
Canadian.  Unlike non-white Canadians, whose skin colour guarantees that they will 
never be wholly accepted by (white) Canadian society, white immigrants may be 
lured by the fact that their skin colour makes their total assimilation if not 
guaranteed, then certainly possible. 
 Marlatt’s colonial family, emigrant parents, and immigrant self are all 
evident, in altered forms (as Mrs. Ana Richards, Ina, and Annie, names that are 
similar and yet distinguishable from one another), in Ana Historic.  While I will look 
at these characters in depth in my subsequent chapters, I would like to assert that 
these characters have grown out of Marlatt’s personal experience, and consider the 
way they function in the novel.  What makes these characters so interesting is how 
they conceive of themselves as (white) Canadians.  Mrs. Ana Richards, the colonial 
wife of 1873, represents not only the colonizers of Canada, but also general white 
neocolonial beliefs evident in all corners of the country today.  Ina is the emigrant, 
the Canadian who is always “looking back” to her or his family’s country of ethnic 
origin.  In this character we see the troubles inherent in our superficial 
multiculturalism that encourages a romantic but irresponsible celebration of one’s 
ethnic heritage.23  Annie, the immigrant, embraces her new country, yet feels the 
compulsion to “amputate” her history, which is as problematic an internal conflict as 
living in nostalgia. Canadian whiteness, it seems, is directly linked to the imagination 
of the colonizer, the emigrant, and the immigrant.  
 Marlatt’s use of these three characters whose identities are interwoven with 
each other throughout the text emphasizes her understanding that each woman’s 
identity is at least partly constructed upon the history of her forbearers—their 
identities are contextual and interdependent.  In the “Referential Aesthetic of 
Autobiography,” Paul John Eakin says of autobiography that  
[it] is, of course, a repetition of the past, but a repetition with a 
difference.[ . . .] Repetition of the past is necessarily a supplement to 
it and never merely a mirror of it.  Whenever it is performed, the act 
of repetition tacitly confirms that reality not yet made into the 
referential fiction of autobiography—life as it is or was—is never 
entirely acceptable to the autobiographer.  It is the made form of a life 
that brings acceptance or at least understanding.  (138) 
He expands on this idea in “Relational Selves, Relational Lives,” adding that 
repetition with a difference “affords an opportunity to set the story straight, to speak 
the unspoken, to repair the ruptures of the past” (73).  Through Annie’s archival 
work/rewriting and simultaneous life-writing, we see Eakin’s theory in action; Annie 
reconstructs the pasts of Ana, Ina, and her own self, but forms those lives to make 
them acceptable.  By acceptable, however, I do not necessarily mean more palatable 
or aesthetically pleasing, but acceptable in the sense that Annie feels she has set the 
story straight, spoken the unspoken, and repaired the ruptures (and omissions) of the 
past.  In this regard, Annie’s self becomes one that is both “product and producer” 
(Perreault, “Autography/Transformation/Asymmetry” 194).  Not only is Annie, the 
primary life-writer, the product of her family (Ina) and her culture (Ana), but she is 
also the producer of that identity as she reframes and reforms her predecessors’ 
stories.   
Although Perreault appreciates Eakin’s assertions, such as his claim that the 
self is relational, she does challenge that he does not examine “self invention” when 
he examines selfhood (Writing Selves 6-7).  Perhaps Perreault interprets Eakin’s 
allowance for setting the record straight, speaking the unspoken, and repairing the 
ruptures of the past as “factual” writing, rather than inventive.  Eakin acknowledges, 
however, that the “pervasive initiative has been to establish autobiography as an 
imaginative art, with a special emphasis on its fictions” (“Referential Aesthetic” 129-
30).  Perreault distinguishes between autobiography and autography arguing that the 
latter is not “necessarily concerned with the process or unfolding of life events,24 but 
rather makes the writing itself an aspect of selfhood the writer experiences and 
brings into being” (Writing Selves 3-4). While both Eakin and Perreault acknowledge 
the fictional and creative tendencies in autobiographical writing, Perreault’s 
distinction between autobiography and “autography” emphasizes the writing itself, a 
distinction I feel Marlatt would make between her writing and other forms of 
autobiography.  Marlatt creates self not only through an exploration of memories and 
relationships, but also through experimentation with writing and an exploration and 
(re)defining of how language functions for her as a life writer. 
 Marlatt also writes from a lesbian perspective; because white supremacy is 
often married to heterosexual supremacy, the lesbian perspective does reveal another 
valuable insight into Marlatt’s construction of character.25  What I am about to 
present is a necessary simplification, in the interest of containing the scope and 
length of my project, of the intricacies of Marlatt’s experience.  It seems to me, 
however, that Marlatt’s perception and subsequent construction of white identities in 
her characters is greatly enhanced because she is lesbian.  Occasionally, Marlatt 
asserts that a lesbian is situated outside the dominant society, essentially occupying a 
place of marginalization. Typically, a marginalized space carries with it the 
connotations of being less privileged and also less powerful. At the same time, 
however, Marlatt also identifies with the thinking of other lesbian writers such as 
Nicole Brossard, stating that “lesbian culture tries to do something which . . . is 
unimaginable from within the dominant culture.  We try to imagine the fullness of 
who we might be outside of patriarchal reference” (Carr 105).26  When the patriarchy 
is viewed (and critiqued and deconstructed and undermined) from a lesbian 
perspective, the critique is done from a more independent position than would be the 
case from a heterosexual vantage point, because unlike the heterosexual woman 
whose identity is necessarily constructed in relation to men and the patriarchy, the 
lesbian identity is constructed outside, or at least in resistance to, this framework.  
Perhaps because of her resistant position to the patriarchy, Marlatt identifies and is 
so concerned with the “cross-over lines” and “rift lines” among marginalized groups 
that are so categorized by (white) patriarchal society (“Unmaking/Remaking Poetry 
in Her Many Images” 83).27
At play in her work, then, is evidence of her  
becoming aware of dialogue on the (many) fringes, listening to other 
women’s words, realities, [which] is to engage in a delicate balance 
between recognition of difference and recognition of shared ground.  
The balance between i and we—and neither capitalized nor 
capitalizing on the other. (“Difference Embracing” 137)  
Her lowercase personal “i” represents her desire to eliminate the authoritative and 
unquestioned subject position and to replace it with one that acknowledges its place 
alongside, and not in a position of superiority to, other subjects.  Susan Knutson 
argues that: 
Marlatt’s “i” is an “i”/eye; a channel for perception, a conduit that 
gives voice to a woman’s senses: her eyes, ears and skin.  Marlatt 
developed this “i” in explicit opposition to the blindly ethnocentric 
and colonizing posture of white Europeans.  The power relations that 
she criticizes include, but are not limited to, those of gender.  (87) 
Because she recognizes the tendency for the “blindly ethnocentric” white to posit 
him or herself in a position of authority over other groups, her writing interrogates 
and subverts these very tendencies.  In an interview with Brenda Carr, Marlatt 
stresses the importance of “seeing the ways in which we are connected to other 
forms of life, to other races, other classes, [which is a way to] work against the 
domination of one over all others.  The vision feminism embodies, it seems to me, is 
relational, promoting an equivalency of needs, not the privileging of one set” (106).28  
Rather than trying to string tenuous lines between people in an attempt to create a 
“fantasized solidarity,” Marlatt refuses to “overlook the pain of real differences in 
oppression” (Telling It 13), and hence produces writing that is “dangerous” or 
frightening to read because it opens the historical wounds that whiteness, in 
particular, has tried to ignore.  Because themes of colonialism, power/domination, 
lesbianism, class, and ethnocentrism weave throughout Marlatt’s writing and theory, 
she responds to allegations that white feminists have disregarded the challenges 
faced by women whose identities are not the same as those of white, middle-class 
feminists. 
 Marlatt’s “i,” ever vigilant of its effect in the reader, is a subject that 
demonstrates a critical self-awareness not common in traditional Western literature 
(at or before the time that Marlatt wrote Ana Historic).  Marlatt acknowledges that 
“any story, no matter how small, participates in larger cultural ones that to some 
extent determine it.  The larger culture’s narratives perpetuate cultural assumptions, 
if not obviously [. . .] then covertly in how these stories are told” (“Old Scripts” 63).  
Marlatt’s own autobiographical tale, as she tells it in her essays and shadows it in her 
fiction and poetry, is one of these “small” stories (the individual’s story) that both 
participates in and is “to some extent” determined by the larger cultural stories.  
Recalling the time when she was writing Ana Historic, Marlatt recollects: “whole 
phrases came back to me that were my mother’s, habitual phrases that sounded the 
very texture of who she is in me and through her the residue of my grandmother—
and beyond her, who knows?” (“The In-Between” 116).  Marlatt’s story is born out 
of her familial heritage, a story larger than her own, but that story is the product of 
the larger colonial and cultural heritage, a story that she has helped write, but that has 
also partially “written her”.   
 After “entering in[to]” Canada and becoming a Canadian citizen, Marlatt 
wrestled with her colonial heritage, presuming, perhaps, that to be Canadian and to 
be colonialist are mutually exclusive identities.  In “Her(e) in the Labyrinth: 
Reading/Writing Theory (1992-1997),” Marlatt discusses this struggle and her 
subsequent epiphany, wondering, “How to dredge up from the backwaters what i so 
insistently & for so many years tried to drown so that i could become Canadian: non-
imperial, ‘guiltless’ (i realize this is a neurosis Anglo-Canadians share, & a personal 
fetish too no doubt)” (197).  Marlatt, an immigrant and the child of parents engaged 
in the colonial enterprise, initially believes that to be a (white) Canadian is to cast 
aside any ties to colonial guilt.  Her realization, however, that colonial guilt is a 
personal fetish of the contemporary white Canadian, is a critical thrust behind my 
assertion that to be a white Canadian is to embody the colonizer, the emigrant, and 
the immigrant.   
 Marlatt’s colonial upbringing in Penang, before her arrival in Canada, 
contributed a great deal to her understanding of the ways in which white identity is 
constructed, an understanding that translates well to the Canadian context. White 
identity is not only built out of the white individual’s self-perception, but it is also 
powerfully shaped by how others (non-whites) view that individual.  Marlatt tells the 
story of standing in a Chinese tailor’s shop as a young girl, and the wordless 
exchange she had with a young Malaysian girl: 
i stared out between the blinds at the usual stream of shoppers, 
loiterers, hawkers. [. . .] Saw, for a long moment, a girl younger than 
me, hanging around the tea-stall across the way, called back by others 
but staring with that territorial rudeness i knew, staring between 
people and cars at me, the outsider in her father’s (was it? her 
uncle’s?) shop—while i, guardian of this gorgeous mother, just as 
rudely stared back. [. . .] The confines of colonialism, its rigid 
window frame i was trained to gaze out of, and another i gazing back 
from the edges of her own view, positing something outside my 
particular context.  In this glimpse, glimpse only, do i make up what 
she feels?  How else do i know who she might be?  In the writing / 
reading / re-membering that constitutes such glimpses, she alters me.  
(“For the Private Reader” 222) 
 
This passage is rich with Marlatt’s interpretation of the colonial or white/nonwhite 
relationship.  When the young white girl locks eyes with her Malaysian counterpart, 
she immediately begins to translate the girl’s behaviour.  She imagines that the girl is 
“called back” by those around her, implying that the girl is hastily retrieved from her 
attempts to engage (in confrontation?) with the white child.  Marlatt also believes 
that the girl is “staring with territorial rudeness,” a look which the white girl saucily 
returns because she is the “guardian of [her] gorgeous mother” but also, perhaps, 
because she feels herself the object of another’s gaze.  Only seconds into her 
encounter with this girl, the child Marlatt ascribed to the Malaysian girl a hostile and 
territorial disposition toward Marlatt, the imperial child.  While Marlatt may very 
well have interpreted the girl’s look accurately, it is more important to note that as 
Marlatt defines the girl’s behaviour, she is also defining herself.  By noting that the 
girl is territorial, Marlatt recognizes that she (and her mother) are in someone else’s 
land, and that she is the “outsider.”  Her use of the window metaphor to describe the 
colonial gaze is apt, not only denoting that the gaze (her gaze) is housed in a (social) 
construction, but also revealing it is through this window and its mediating pane that 
she has been trained to look, and that her sight is limited by its frame.  Marlatt was 
unable to see beyond the limits of the colonial framework at that time.  In the 
“writing/reading/re-membering” of the event, however, Marlatt not only employs her 
lowercase “i” to talk about herself, but also realizes that the other girl is “another i 
gazing back from the edges of her own view.”  As an adult, much changed by her life 
experiences, she sees beyond her own perspective and realizes that the girl with 
whom she shared that moment of tremendous personal impact is also an “i” with her 
“own view.”  When Marlatt admits that her view of the girl was merely a “glimpse,” 
perhaps she is also admitting her readiness as a child to make assumptions about the 
girl and her thoughts.  Thus, when Marlatt asks, “Do i make up what she feels?” the 
question can be interpreted in two ways.  First, and in the context of Marlatt as a 
child, Marlatt wonders if her presence in the girl’s father’s (uncle’s?) shop elicits an 
emotional response from the girl.  But looking back, Marlatt wonders if she imagined 
(made up, invented) what the girl was feeling, thereby attributing to the girl 
territorial attitudes generated by Marlatt’s colonial window frame. When she asks, 
“How else do i know who she might be?” she recognizes that not only is her 
understanding of the Other girl based upon a “glimpse,” or an incomplete and 
insufficient knowledge base, but also that her understanding is blurred by her 
colonial vision.  How could she possibly know the Malaysian girl outside of the 
white girl’s colonially-trained vision?  Finally, when Marlatt concludes that in “the 
writing / reading / re-membering that constitutes such glimpses, she alters me,” 
Marlatt acknowledges, as many theorists have, that the “colonized” figure is not 
passive, but affects the colonizer and that writing about this figure is a transformative 
act.29   
Razack discusses this idea regarding the white and Aboriginal relationship, 
asking “We may know how colonization changed Aboriginal people, but do we 
know how it changed, and continues to change, white people?” (19). Indeed, whites 
have been changed by colonization in Canada and are still being changed by 
neocolonial relations, and white identities are formed by the interaction with and 
relationships to Aboriginal people.  For Marlatt, the act of “writing / reading / re-
membering” the Other “alters” the white identity of her characters.  Jessica Benjamin 
asserts that “at the very moment of realizing our own independence, we are 
dependant on another to recognize it” (qtd. in Eakin, “Relational Selves” 67).  The 
formation of one’s racialized identity seems to provide a particularly poignant 
example of the “relational” nature of identity construction.  As I asserted in Chapter 
One, although it is a highly problematic trait, the white identity seems to depend 
upon a comparison with non-white groups to define itself. Because writing, reading, 
and remembering are acts of creation, interpretation, and reconstruction 
(remembering), the Other that “alters” the white writing / reading / re-membering 
subject is imagined in this process, and that white subject has projected upon the 
Other his or her deliberate or subconscious misconceptions. The white subject 
defines itself then, in comparison to this imagined and not real Other.  Donna 
Haraway, in “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” argues that “the Western eye has fundamentally 
been a wandering eye, a traveling lens.  These peregrinations have often been violent 
and insistent on having mirrors for a conquering self—but not always” (586).  In 
Haraway’s “but not always” lies Marlatt’s writing because she recognizes and 
subverts the white insistence on gazing into the “mirror” of the other.   
 The intricacies of “seeing” the Other ultimately reflect the subject engaging 
in that act.  Haraway asks, “How to see?  Where to see from?  What limits to vision?  
What to see for? Whom to see with?  Who gets to have more than one point of view?  
Who gets blinded?  Who wears blinders?  Who interprets the visual field?” (587), to 
which Marnina Gonick adds her paraphrase, “vision is therefore always a question of 
the power to see” (94).  Both Haraway and Gonick interrogate the act of seeing, 
moving beyond an investigation of who or what is seen, and toward a questioning of 
the seeing subject.  Marlatt asks the same types of questions, and through her use of 
life writing interrogates herself (and others) as seeing subject.  Life writing as a 
genre differs greatly from that of its precursor, autobiography, in that life writing is 
“the playground for new relationships both within and without the text,” whereas 
“autobiography proper,” as once believed, “requires too much unity of narrative, and 
too much ‘objective’ or reasoned thinking, too much author/ity of the author to be as 
irreverent as life writing can be” (Kadar 152).30  While Marlatt’s life, experiences, 
and wisdom are certainly worthy of recording, life writing, not autobiography, is best 
suited to her subject matter, her style, and her purpose.   
As previously discussed, Marlatt’s writing often focuses on the cross-over 
and rift lines among marginalized groups.  She approaches her subject matter both as 
one who has experienced marginalization and as one who has occupied the position 
of privilege.   She refuses to employ the authoritative “I,” and she refuses to feign a 
unified subject position, using the “i” as a symbol of her complex identity.  This 
“split and contradictory self,” as Haraway names it, is “one who can interrogate 
positionings and be accountable, one who can construct and join rational 
conversations and fantastic imaginings that change history” (586). Marlatt’s subject 
matter often pivots upon notions of the self and identity that challenge those 
traditional in autobiography, and “interrogate[s] positionings,” striving to be 
accountable to herself and the reader. Finally, her handling of the self and identity 
contributes to both “rational and fantastic imaginings” that actually do, particularly 
in the case of Ana Historic, “change history,” both through a reinterpretation and a 
re-imagining of that history. 
 Stylistically, Marlatt takes full advantage of the freedoms afforded in the 
genre of life writing.  Marlatt’s most substantial body of work is represented in 
collections of poetry, and her poetic voice carries through into her works of fiction, 
Ana Historic and, to a lesser extent, Taken.  For this reason, it seems doubly ironic 
that the cover of Ana Historic reads, “A Novel,” for the argument could be made that 
it is, in fact, an extended poem, a novel in poetry, or poetic prose.  From poetry, 
Marlatt transposes into her novel experimental uses of white space, language, and a 
“narrative” that is disjointed or fragmented and deliberately incomplete.  Yet Marlatt 
refers to the work not as poetry but as a fiction (or rather, “fictionalysis,” a term to 
which I will shortly return), and so we recognize that her use of experimental writing 
between the covers of her novel is a strategy that tells us she is uncomfortable 
assuming the authoritative position required to tell “the whole story.”  In life writing, 
Marlatt notes: 
We run up against the reductiveness of language which wants to 
separate truth from fiction, figure from ground, self from nothing.  
Who’s the creator here anyway?  Maybe language after all, despite 
itself.  But that’s only if we can subvert its mainline story, that black 
stands to white as woman to man. (“Self-Representation” 126) 
For Marlatt, language is both the enemy and the ally of the self; traditional Western 
language is, in part, the very rigid window frame of colonialism, patriarchy, and 
heterosexism through which whites are trained to gaze. Its essentializing nature 
prunes the branching self, “creating” a tidy and manageable narrative inside of which 
is trapped a life that has been forced into an unnatural shape reflecting the prevailing 
cultural ideologies. The English language is not prêt à porter for all those who speak 
and write in the language; using language without first subjecting it to critical 
scrutiny allows it to become the sole creator or the shaper of the self being written.  
But language can become the ally of the life writer if its “mainline story” is 
subverted.  When used experimentally, and when its pre-written, ideologized 
qualities are broken open, allowing the self to be anything in between or outside of 
truth and fiction, figure and ground, or self and other, then language can function in a 
creatively positive manner rather than in a restricting or oppressive manner. 
 Marlatt’s own style of life writing subverts both the patriarchal and imperial 
English language and discourse that she employs in ways that suit her purposes, and 
the genre of autobiography in which some may mistakenly believe she works. 
Traditional readers of traditional autobiographies assume they are reading about 
whole lives recorded in the most truthful and objective manner possible. Critics 
frequently focus upon the purported truthfulness of the autobiographical work, citing 
the impossible challenges the writer faces to remain objective, to remember events 
accurately, and to select (and selectively omit) “relevant” segments of the life 
written.   Marlatt, however, does not assume these responsibilities, for they are 
limiting, problematic, and further, impossible to fulfill.  Instead, she says: 
As they explore representations of identity women writers often 
consciously play with the notion of the autobiographer’s pact to tell 
the truth.  They deliberately blur concepts of what constitutes fiction 
and what constitutes documentary or, more largely, non-fiction, and, 
in the process, come up with a genre [fictionalysis] that stands on the 
threshold of announcing itself as something different from either.  
(“Performing on the Stage of Her Text” 208) 
Marlatt does not engage in writing that presents itself as more truthful than 
autobiography in the sense that problems with truth and objectivity are overcome, 
but rather she acknowledges that these challenges are inherent in the life writing 
process and then reflects this understanding in her life writing.  In “Self-
Representation and Fictionalysis,” Marlatt discusses how she has grafted into her 
writing the obstacles that might otherwise have made achieving self-representative 
results impossible: 
Perhaps what we wake up to in autobiography is a beginning 
realization of the whole cloth of ourselves in connection with so many 
others. [. . .] It is exactly in the confluence of fiction (the self or selves 
we might be) and analysis (of the roles we have found ourselves in, 
defined in a complex socio-familial weave), it is in the confluence of 
these two that autobiography occurs, the writing self writing its way 
to life, whole life. [. . .] Autobiography is not separable from poetry 
for me on this ground I would call fictionalysis: a self-analysis that 
plays fictively with the primary images of one’s life, a fiction that 
uncovers analytically that territory where fact and fiction coincide.  
(124) 
 
Marlatt values the imagined self (selves) as the self (selves) that grows out of “the 
roles we have found ourselves in.”  The imagined self may be one that comes from 
the writer’s re-membering, through the careful selection and omission of life events 
recorded, or out of something entirely “made-up,” a notion that she also explores in 
“Self-Representation and Fictionalysis.”  She contemplates the relative value 
attributed to those things that are real and those things that are fictitious, that come 
out of “nothing”: 
In our culture of ready-mades, making anything is an 
accomplishment, making something of yourself even more so, but add 
that little word “up” and you add speciousness, you add a sneer.  
Children learn that dressing themselves is an achievement, but 
dressing up is only play, child’s play as we say of something easy.  
Yet as children we know that play is not only easy, it is also absorbing 
and immensely serious, that play is the actual practice (not factual but 
act-tual) of who else we might be.  (123-24) 
According to Marlatt’s understanding of (Western?) society, the presence of 
anything other than the “factual” is regarded with suspicion and derision.  In life 
writing, however, or in fictionalysis, there is room for “dressing up” in the many 
layers of identity that comprise the writing self.  Because of Marlatt’s theory and 
practice of fictionalysis as a means of exploring the self (identity) and the 
intersecting “territory where fact and fiction coincide,” her work reflects a startling 
consciousness of the self as a socially constructed entity.  The forces contributing to 
Marlatt’s identity-as-construction range from social and cultural influences to 
contributions by her communities, and can be traced further to the influences of her 
family and, finally, to Marlatt’s own creative and imagined self-construction: all of 
these are investigated, interrogated, and represented in Marlatt’s writing.  As 
Haraway says of subjectivity, “it is always constructed and stitched together 
imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming 
to be another” (586).  Because Marlatt acknowledges that her identity is constructed 
(and imperfectly so), and because in Ana Historic she interrogates her identity 
through characters who represent aspects of herself or influences in her life, she is 
able to explore her identity in relation to other people. 
 Marlatt’s purpose as a life writer is, ultimately, to “write for her life.”  For 
Marlatt, life writing accomplishes  
the many small real-(other)-i-zations [that] can bring the unwritten, 
unrecognized, ahistoric ground of a life into being as a recognizable 
power or agency.  This happens when we put together the disparate 
parts of our lives and begin to see the extensiveness of that cloth of 
connectedness we are woven into.  Then we begin, paradoxically, to 
weave for ourselves the cloth of our life as we want it to be.  For it is 
in the energetic imagining of all that we are that we can enact 
ourselves. (“Self-Representation and Fictionalysis” 127) 
Marlatt seems to address her own needs as a writer “enacting herself” but also the 
needs of a greater community into which she has woven herself and been woven.  
Perreault suggests that “the embodied self articulated in the context of a feminist 
community is essential to that community and changes (a little at a time) the world” 
(“Selves Intersecting” 132).  Helen Buss, in her introduction to a life writing issue of 
Prairie Fire, also notes that life writers indeed fulfill the needs of their communities: 
“The autobiographer offers a portion of vulnerability of the personal self in a gesture 
of public testimony in order to facilitate some communal therapeutic purpose, to 
effect some change, some healing, some new ways of being in the world” (6).  
Indeed, in her many works, I would argue that Marlatt accomplishes each of these 
goals, and in Ana Historic, Marlatt accomplishes these goals as they specifically 
relate to the constructed white identity connected to and woven into Canadian 
society, showing ways of analyzing, rethinking, and hence changing this 
construction. 
  
 
4. The Colonial Canadian 
 
Why, when I was deciding upon a writer who addresses Canadian whiteness 
in her work, did I select an author/poet who was not even born in this country?  It is 
precisely because Marlatt writes from an immigrant-now-Canadian perspective that 
her writing amplifies the identity issues either consciously or subconsciously 
experienced by all non-Aboriginal Canadians.  Whether we31 are first or sixth 
generation Canadians, our ancestral ties can all be followed over land and water to 
other countries, ethnicities, and cultural groups.  And because Canada is a state that 
encourages its citizens to celebrate and preserve their ethnic roots (albeit often in a 
superficial manner), our emigrant/immigrant history frames the manner in which we 
identify with our country and one another.  The more distance non-Aboriginal 
Canadians have from their family’s emigrant/immigrant experience the more tenuous 
that frame may be, but it still contains and shapes the thinking of the non-Aboriginal 
Canadian citizen. We are “ab-original in the new world” (Ana Historic 30), “away” 
from those people who originated in this land (Hawkins 1).   
In Ana Historic, Marlatt conflates the eras and identities of three Canadian 
women, all of whom have British origins.  Mrs. Ana Richards came to Vancouver in 
1873, only two years after British Columbia joined Confederation.  Annie, the 
primary narrator, and her mother, Ina, immigrated to British Columbia in the 1950s. 
Despite the many differences among the women, however, Marlatt perceives many 
similarities that she uses to generate a colonial continuum;32 one woman’s voice 
blends into another’s and for fleeting moments, readers are not certain if they are 
reading the words of Ana, Ina, or Annie.  Through these three characters, Marlatt 
explores the thinking, experiences, and written history that have contributed to 
current white Canadian identities. 
 In its Canadian manifestation, whiteness is grounded in our 
emigrant/immigrant identities, but also and initially in our colonial history.  Marlatt 
grounds both the emigrant/immigrant and the colonial voices in fragments of 
historical documents she uncovers, an activity that is mirrored when Annie uncovers 
historical data in a library's archives.  The historical documents address life in and 
around the Moodyville logging camp, and are “factual” and confident; the men who 
documented the history through which Annie leafs tell “the real story” of “the only 
important events in the world. a tale of their exploits hacked out against a silent 
backdrop of trees” (AH 28).  Only events and names that were deemed of value were 
written down: details of logging operations; the names of recent arrivals to the 
Moodyville logging camp; detailed descriptions of the dimensions of, and 
construction materials used for, the vicarage; the arrival of a piano; and the boat, 
Pearl’s loss in a local race.  The details in these passages are often so tiny and trivial 
that it seems as though no aspect of Moodyville life in 1873 was left unwritten.  Yet 
Annie grasps a loose thread and begins to tug when she reads: “‘Miss Sweney was 
shortly succeeded by Mrs. Richards, who soon became Mrs. Ben Springer and cast 
her lot with the struggling little hamlet’” (AH 39).  Annie wonders about this 
woman, Mrs. Richards, who is never given a first name and whose arrival as the new 
school teacher is worth mention, but whose history beyond her marriage to Ben 
Springer is not written down and, hence, is seemingly of no value or interest.   
Annie gives Mrs. Richards the first name, “Ana,” a variation of both Ina’s 
and her own name.  Annie’s act of naming Mrs. Richards, of completing an 
incomplete record, is her first gesture toward reclaiming not lines, but whole pages 
of unwritten Canadian history. Pamela Banting, commenting on Ana Historic, 
observes that Marlatt’s  
archival documents which support official history undergo a process 
we might call a form of translation, since the documentary language 
becomes denatured, provoked to yield its ideological biases.  The 
language of history breaks down into its components, namely, the 
language of nominalization, categorization, hierarchization, 
domination, colonization, subordination and control. (125) 
Certainly, Ana’s first name is omitted from the archives because of the “language of 
history” that summarily discounts her existence, and as part of the “nominalization, 
categorization, hierarchization, domination, colonization, subordination and control” 
of women’s lives.  As Marlatt and Annie “translate” this history and imagine the first 
immigrant women’s experience, they also investigate Ana’s part in the colonization 
of the Canadian west: Marlatt explores both the racial tensions between Ana, the 
colonizer, and the Aboriginal people of British Columbia (the colonized), and Ana’s 
gendered identity colonized within a patriarchal society. 
Two issues pertaining to colonial identity become prominent in the text. First, 
Ana constructs the First Nations people as Other: Ana’s identity is based, in part, 
upon a white/non-white opposition.  Second, Ana attempts to locate herself, a 
displaced English woman, in the physical space before inhabited only by white 
males, and before their arrival, inhabited only by Aboriginal peoples.  
 Through Ana, Marlatt explores the fears, both historical and contemporary, 
that many white people harbour of non-white people. Whites have perceived non-
whites as physically or sexually threatening, violent, or unpredictable, a perception 
stemming, perhaps, from the traditional Western construction of non-whites as 
animalistic, barbaric, and uncivilized.   These constructions or stereotypes, bell 
hooks remarks critically, “however inaccurate, are one form of representation.  Like 
fictions, they are created to serve as substitutions, standing in for what is real” (Black 
Looks 170).   As Ana walks through the forest of British Columbia, the racial fictions 
she carries with her become evident when she encounters two Siwash men.  
Panicked, Ana wonders: 
What should she say? [. . .] Were they drunk?  ‘They go crazy 
when they drink,’ she heard Mrs. Patterson say. [. . .] Perhaps 
they were furious and meant to do her harm.  She should say 
Good day, something civil, but she froze on the path as they 
approached, sick with the stories she had heard. [. . .] It was 
the sickness of fear and they knew it as they crowded past her 
as if she were a bush, a fern shaking in their way.  (41-42) 
 
Ana faces two obstacles.  First, she struggles with the stories and stereotypes she has 
heard about Native people.  Her fear stems not from any threatening move made by 
the men, but from the threatening image that has been projected upon the men by 
Mrs. Patterson and others, and that Ana has internalized.  In “Remembering Fanon,” 
Homi Bhabha argues that the “white man does not merely deny what he fears and 
desires by projecting it on ‘them’. [. . .] [That] ‘they’ is always an evacuation  and 
emptying of the ‘I’” (119).  Self-conscious of being a strange person in a strange 
place, Ana empties her alienated “I” (a colonist whose mere presence implicates her 
in the displacement of the Aboriginal peoples) onto the men she encounters.33 Her 
thoughts are merely the echoes of what other whites have told her, her evacuated “I” 
a collective construction.34
 Ana, like most colonial (and later, neo-colonial) whites, does not recognize 
her fears of the Other as an “evacuation and emptying” of her individual or collective 
identity.  To do so would to be to acknowledge the social ugliness and fragility that 
is inherent in the white colonial identity and yet is contradictory to the way whites 
perceive themselves.  Richard Dyer explains: “Socialized to believe the fantasy, that 
whiteness represents goodness and all that is benign and non-threatening, many 
white people assume that this is the way black people conceptualize whiteness” (qtd. 
in hooks, Black Looks 169 ).  Hooks counters “that one fantasy of whiteness is that 
the threatening Other is always a terrorist.  This projection enables many white 
people to imagine there is no representation of whiteness as terror, terrorizing” 
(Black Looks 174).  Marlatt reveals traces of the white as terrorizing in a key passage 
with Ana, as the school teacher.  As Ana tries to teach a Siwash child, Lily, the letter 
“a,” the child “pull[s] her hand back, her small body drawn into itself and coiled like 
a spring away from the teacher’s desk, not touching it, not touching anything.  She 
had felt Ana’s impatience and was embarrassed” (AH 91-92).  Despite Ana’s 
attempts to maintain a judicious classroom—despite her “goodness” and “benign” 
and “non-threatening” ways—Lily withdraws from Ana’s contact, her vulnerability 
apparent to both Ana and the reader.  In the same passage, Lily’s brother is terrorized 
by one of the white boys (and then, indirectly, by his father).   Ana’s attempts to 
force the white students to respect the Native and Kanakan students are met with 
rebuke, not only from the white students but also from Danny’s father, a member of 
the school board.   After Danny assaults Lily’s brother, all of the children, white and 
non-white, watch for Ana’s reaction, for she is the authority figure in the class.  
Although she tries to assert herself, Danny’s pointed comment (and threatening 
physical stance) ultimately communicate to the class that Ana, a white woman, is 
virtually powerless in the patriarchal colonial machine: “ ‘And I’m telling you, 
Ma’am, I’m not sitting next to any stinking halfbreed--’ extricating his full length 
from the schoolbench to face her.  ‘My dad says I don’t have to neither, and he’s a 
Trustee’” (AH 92).  Marlatt reveals the complexities of Ana’s colonial identity; while 
she is a colonizer, she does not wield the same power within colonial society that 
someone like Colonel Miller does, for reasons of gender, and possibly class.  Dyer 
identifies the same duality in white women’s positions, arguing that they 
“simultaneously stand for white power and yet are shown to be unable to exercise it 
effectively or to change what they perceive to be its abuses” (30). 
 Marlatt does not restrict representations of the colonial fear of the Other to 
the passages pertaining to Ana, however.  Similar fears are evident in the passages 
voiced by Ina, who passes her paranoia on to her daughter, Annie, thus creating a 
colonial continuum.  The fears demonstrated by Ina are similar to Ana’s, even 
though each woman occupies a very different place in time. Annie recalls her 
mother’s warnings about “the woods,” the wild and “anonymous territory” that lies 
beyond their house: “‘never go into the woods with a man,’ you said, ‘and don’t go 
into the woods alone’” (AH 18).  For all three women, the woods are unknown and, 
based on the warnings of other whites (colonizers), are potentially dangerous.  Not 
only do the warnings imply a physical threat but they also imply a sexual threat from 
men in general.  For Annie and Ina, the woods are a place where a girl’s sexual 
“purity” might be sullied, where one might become a “tramp, slut, [or] bitch” (AH 
34). Yet Annie describes the woods, so feared by her mother, with erotic language: 
“the soughing, sighing of bodies, the cracks and chirps, odd rustles, something like 
breath escaping, [was] something inhuman i slipped through” (AH 18).  Despite the 
patriarchal and colonial warnings to stay out of the woods and to stick to the paths, 
both Ana and Anna seek the woods as a refuge. 
 Annie “escape[s] to” the wood, a tract of land that bears no evidence of 
(patriarchal) development, also escaping her mother’s conservative and critical eye.  
In this environment, Annie feels transformed and claims for herself a new identity: “i 
was native, i was the child who grew up with wolves, original lost girl, elusive, 
vanished from the world of men” (AH 18).  In a later passage, Annie claims to be 
“feeling black” (AH 59).  Annie’s identification with non-white images and identities 
grows out of Ana’s similar identification with images and spaces that are in apparent 
“opposition” to her colonial roots.  Through Annie’s imagination, Ana admits that: 
she writes as if she were living alone in the woods, her vision trued to 
trees and birds.  she filters out the hive of human activity in which her 
‘cabin’ sits [. . .] in the dark [. . .] she can overlook the stumps, the 
scarred face of the clearing that surrounds her, and see herself ab-
original in the new world (it is the old one she is at the end of). (AH 
30) 
Ana also confesses that her “keenest pleasure is to walk the woods, despite their [her 
fellow colonizers’] scolding me most roundly as to its dangers” (AH 31). These 
passages are both revealing and disturbing.  Both Annie and Ana feel compelled 
toward identification with anti-colonial spaces.  Although both characters are clearly 
situated as a white colonial or neo-colonial Canadian, neither perceives her own 
identity as so easily defined; each both trespasses and is trespassed upon.  For Annie 
and Ana, their gender, sexuality, creativity, and other factors complicate their white 
colonial identities, and encourage them both to seek identification with and to 
trespass upon other/Other groups.   
 What troubles me about Ana’s and Annie’s identification with the non-white, 
however, is their tendency to appropriate the position of the non-white while 
forgetting or ignoring how they are implicated in the social mechanisms and 
institutions that work to oppress non-white Canadians.  Ana sees herself as “alone in 
the woods,” forgetting that those woods are already inhabited by the true native 
people of Canada.  Similarly, Annie recalls a childhood memory of a foray into the 
woods with her sister, as a journey “without history” during which they imagined 
they “were the first ones there, the first trespassers” (AH 19).  Annie, like Ana, at 
first seems to disregard or forget about the people who lived on Canadian soil before 
the arrival of the colonizers.  Indeed, this selective historical amnesia seems to 
cripple the minds of many white Canadians whose knowledge of Canadian history 
commences with the arrival of the first white people on Canadian soil, and not with 
the history of Canada’s Aboriginal populations.  Frankenberg, in the very first pages 
of her book, insists that talking about whiteness involves talking about colonial and 
imperial history (7).   For this reason, among many others, Ana Historic is a poignant 
critique of white identity in Canada, because Marlatt constructs her characters with 
an acute understanding of the (colonial) histories that have contributed to their 
ambivalent identities. 
 Ana’s and Annie’s shared and divergent colonial histories are emphasized 
with the passages that replicate actual historical documents.   Initially, I struggled to 
determine whether Annie, a narrative persona, or Marlatt herself provides some of 
the commentary that accompanies (and interprets) these historical passages.  The 
narrator (which narrator?) criticizes Ina  
for not knowing there was first of all:  
 
‘a clearing three hundred and fifty yards along the shore, two 
hundred  and fifty yards into the forest, boxed in by tall trees; damp, 
wet, the actual clearing littered with stumps and forest debris, and a 
profusion of undergrowth, including luxuriant skunk cabbage.’ 
 not knowing that there was first of all a mill and then:   
 
‘three hotels: Deighton’s, Sunnyside, and Joe Mannion’s; one 
grocery store, and Chinese wash house, and lock-up.’  (AH 27) 
If these words were Marlatt’s, I would be greatly disturbed that she, too, would 
forget that there was something before the clearings and the buildings; if she could 
forget that these things were not “first”.  But I am then reassured that the narrative 
voice is either Annie’s or that of a narrative persona, because later in the novel Annie 
finally learns that “we are the trespassers” (AH 87), acknowledging that she and her 
predecessor, Ana, are walking on land that has not always been theirs. 
To return to Ana’s encounter with the Siwash men, their construction as 
Other in Ana’s mind is apparent because she consciously contemplates how she 
should respond to these men, rather than reacting in a natural and spontaneous 
fashion.  She asks of herself, “What should [I] say?’ and decides that she “should say 
Good day, [or] something civil.”  Ana embodies the social expectations of her 
culture.  Had she met a Scottish logger on the path, she would have greeted him 
amiably and unselfconsciously, but because the men are not white, Ana questions her 
prescribed social “formulas.”  In her mind, she is not greeting men on the path, but 
Indian men, a situation which confuses her expectations of the social exchange.  Ana 
confesses that she felt “fear[ful],” “ashamed,” and “furious at herself” (42).  Based 
upon actual (women’s) autobiography written in the same era such as Moodie’s 
Roughing It in the Bush or Anna Brownell Jameson’s Winter Studies and Summer 
Rambles in Canada, Ana’s fear seems to be an authentic response.  Yet her shame 
and anger seem to be twentieth-century projections onto a character who would not 
have recognized her foolishness.  Indeed, Ana’s shame and anger seem to stem from 
her realization that she was gullible to believe the gossip of Mrs. Patterson and the 
other immigrants. 
 What is problematic in this passage, however, is the way in which Marlatt 
uses Ana (herself a semi-fictive construction) to speculate upon the Siwash men’s 
thoughts.  Helen Buss warns that there are many ethical considerations to be made 
when “ghostwriting others’ autobiographical expression” (26).  Ana’s narrative is, in 
many ways, a ghostwritten or fictitious autobiography.  The character of Ana, and 
her life events, are often speculative on the part of Marlatt.  Ana’s character, 
however, also “creates” thoughts for the Others whom she encounters.   
In the passage in which Ana meets the Siwash men, Ana believes that the 
men knew she was afraid as they pushed past her.  Further on, Marlatt writes: “They 
were walking away slowly and only themselves, amused, she thought, with a kind of 
silent laughter.  They had merely passed a white woman in the woods while she, she 
was sure to be killed” (42).  While Ana is no longer frightened in the situation, the 
men’s position of Other is reinforced by Ana’s belief that they are laughing at her, 
and that they identify her as different from themselves because she is a “white 
woman in the woods.” Through Ana’s problematic speculation on the men’s 
thoughts, Marlatt does honestly and adeptly capture the colonial/white tendency to 
presume to know what the Other thinks.  Marlatt explores this tendency and its 
origins (at least, for Ana): 
Once she [Ana] has been frightened by the Indian crone they called 
the Virgin Mary, who had risen like an apparition out of bush, and 
joining the trail with her basket of shoots, roots, whatever they were, 
had given her a singularly flat look, a look not at her but through, as if 
she were a bush or fern.  At first she thought the old woman was 
blind, but no blind could find the path like that.  There had been a 
large amount of sky in those eyes. [. . .] She would like to know what 
those eyes saw. (AH 96) 
Again, Ana interprets an Aboriginal person’s non-verbal communication in a 
negative light. In this passage, however, we learn that Ana’s tendency to make 
assumptions about the Aboriginal person’s intentions stems, at least in part, from her 
genuine curiousity about who that person is and why she is that way.  But even when 
she wonders what it would be like to be that old woman and “what [her] eyes saw,” 
she assumes (and rightfully so) that their experiences are different.  In doing so, 
though, she disregards how she and the Indian crone might also share common 
ground.  Dyer has identified, in the works of Toni Morrison, Edward Said and others, 
the assertion that 
White discourse implacably reduces the non-white subject to being a 
function of the white subject, not allowing her/him space or 
autonomy, permitting neither the recognition of similarities nor the 
acceptance of differences except as a means for knowing the white 
self.  (13) 
As Ana realizes the differences (whether real or imagined) between herself 
and the Native people, her own identity as a white woman becomes more clear.  
Every time she notes how “they” are different, she does so by comparing them and 
their culture to herself and her culture.  The Aboriginal people cannot be different in 
and of themselves—they must be different from something else (e.g. white people).  
Ruth Frankenberg’s study on whiteness revealed that whiteness “seem[s] 
comprehensible to many only by referring to the Others excluded from [this] 
categor[y]” (17).  The ways in which the Aboriginal people are “different” define the 
ways in which white is “normal.”  White people, in an environment composed of 
only white people, are not aware of their whiteness. It is an undetected yet significant 
part of their identities.  When whites enter an environment composed of people with 
skin tones and cultural practices other than those with which the whites are familiar, 
however, they then presume that their collective identity is normative and that all 
others are deviations from this standard, rather than considering that they themselves 
are visually or culturally different. 
Marlatt puts Ana in close proximity with Aboriginal characters, allowing Ana 
to illustrate how the white’s whiteness is affirmed when in the presence of someone 
non-nonwhite.  Ana encounters Native and Kanakan children in her schoolroom, but 
she also has close exchanges with non-white people in more personal spaces.  Ana 
remarks in her journal that she observed Ruth35: 
pass her fingers slowly over the slate, as if the letters marked thereon 
might leap into her very skin.  Our Magic is different from theirs, I 
see—And yet it cannot capture them—the quiet with which each 
seems wrapt, a Grace that –the Grace of direct perception, surely, 
untroubled by letters, by mirrors, by some foolish notion of 
themselves such as we suffer from.  (AH 69) 
Ruth, a Siwash woman bearing a Biblical name that “cannot be her real name” (has 
she been whitewashed?) relationship with Ana interests us not only because of what 
Ruth seems to reveal about Siwash identity, but also (and perhaps more so), what 
their relationship reveals about white identity (AH 69).  Ana’s view of Ruth is 
romanticized when Ana uses Ruth as a contrast to Ana’s white culture.  Where Ruth 
(and presumably other Siwash people) are not “troubled by letters, by mirrors, [or] 
by some foolish notion of [self],” Ana implies that whites are very much troubled by 
such things: the endless recording of events, the obsessive preoccupation with 
appearance and reputation, and the narcissism that can only be enjoyed by a 
privileged person.  To a certain extent, certain colonial preoccupations must have, 
indeed, seemed peculiar and foolish to, for example, Aboriginal people.  On the other 
hand, though, Ana reduces Ruth to a simpler being than herself, making assumptions 
about what does not trouble her, and never considering the types of thing that might 
be troubling her. 
 Ana is involved even more intimately with the Native people when she and 
Harriet, “the Indian Girl,” are present for the birth of Jeannie Alexander’s baby, the 
first white birth of Hastings Mill (AH 126).  Ana, of course, is there as a guest, while 
Harriet’s role is that of a servant.  In a surreal scene, Harriet carries out a rocker, 
cushions, and the “tea things” so that the (white) women might have proper tea while 
Jeannie nears labour.  Harriet moves about “directly,” not announcing “her coming 
or going at all” (AH 115).  That Ana notices and finds worthy of remark Harriet’s 
movements indicates that Harriet’s ways of being in the social situation are 
noticeably different than those of the colonial women present.  Again, Ana uses an 
Aboriginal woman as a measuring stick for her own identity.  Harriet’s “direct” 
movements may remind Ana of her own tentative and hesitant movements, both in 
Britain, under the watchful eye of her father, and in the Canadian colony (and under 
the watchful eye of “fathers” such as school officials), where she is unsure of her 
place in the new society. Ana, it seems, feels accountable to a great many people: her 
father, her boss, her future husband, the other women of Hastings Mill, and the 
Aboriginal people with whom she engages.36   
 For Ana, undoubtedly, there are times when she feel she must record every 
movement and even every thought, as is apparent in her self-censuring struggle to 
“account for herself” (and always to her father) when she writes in her journal (AH 
83).  Moreover, the directness of Ana’s movements often seems encumbered by the 
weight of social (patriarchal and colonial) expectations and conventions to which she 
is also accountable, symbolized most effectively with the recurring motif of tea.37  At 
times in the novel, tea appears as unremarkably as one might expect, such as when 
Ana feels it is tea she needs (“a good strong cup of Darjeeling”) before she can sit 
down to write in her journal.  Tea reappears, following a colonial “grocery list,” as 
part of the social etiquette among the various women at Hastings Mill, as Ana 
records that she is to have “tea at Mrs. A’s with S., Mrs A. very big with child.  S.— 
I am so to call her, formality she said will not withstand the rigours of life in ‘the 
bush’—S. is forthright by nature and perhaps by Yankee custom” (AH 113).  While 
Susan Patterson has no predilection toward observing strict social conventions (and 
hence insists that Ana call her by her first name), Ana dismisses this behaviour 
because Patterson is American, and also because of her intimate role as nurse and 
midwife.38  Mrs. A (Jeannie Anderson) and the other women, however, still observe 
the formalities associated with tea.  Tea is poured out of a “silver pot” (despite being 
in “the bush”), an image that contrasts the “civilized” with the “wild.” 39 Annie 
imagines (and projects from her own experience) the importance of tea to Ana’s 
social circle: 
tea to be sipped, a saving grace.  the reward of freight, lace at the cuff, 
backbone properly erect, extended on a silver plate a sigh (shared), 
small talk, small things in hand.  conserves, preserves of energy 
lapped with the turning tide. to savour is to know how to pace, lacing 
fortitude and will with a temperate grace. (AH 115-16) 
The language used to describe the taking of tea, as a symbol of colonial tradition, is 
heavy in two senses.  The tea passages are laden with the paraphernalia of tea—one 
does not simply drink tea, one performs tea (as in the Japanese tea ceremony)—and 
so we learn of the gendered costume (“lace at the cuff”), the posture (“backbone 
properly erect”), the props (“silver plate”), and the foods (conserves and preserves).  
But the passages are also weighted with an overbearing sense of restraint (tea to be 
sipped and savoured, not gulped), of affectation (shared sighs and “small talk”), and 
of control (“lacing fortitude and will with a temperate grace”).  The aforementioned 
passage reveals the desirable characteristics of the colonizer and the white: practicing 
and conveying the impression of control and restraint (signs of superiority) through 
the vehicles of obvious social “grace,” pomp, and circumstance.40   
Annie interprets, then, that Ana (and Annie?) were  
having tea as if.  manners maketh woman, into lady – the lady-would-
rather, that indirect thing a pose, a mode of offering, circuitous.  
figurehead, and having nothing.  tea the liquid medium in which they 
breast the unspoken.  going around in circles.  claimed, unable to 
claim.  boarded (up). (AH 116) 
Here, the tea image boils; the simple motif becomes more complex.  First tea 
functions as a domestic marker. Then it reveals its colonial roots, the social 
conventions tied to colonialism (and white identity) and its repressive and controlling 
nature.  For Marlatt and Annie, these qualities seem to culminate in a repressive 
environment for women, even though these women exist within the inner sanctum of 
colonial society.  Ana is always experiencing conflict between what is expected of 
her and her inclinations.  Perhaps she feels that if she meets with the other wives for 
tea, sits properly, is well-mannered, and engages in the ever-circling conversations 
(that is, if she fulfils her social contract), then she can board up those wild tendencies 
of hers that are incongruous with the identity of a proper, white English woman.  
And certainly, Ana’s experience and narrative illuminate the difference 
between being a colonial man and a colonial woman.  While there are passages in 
which Ana reflects colonial thinking that could convincingly be that of a man or 
woman, there are also passages in which gender becomes a crucial component of 
Ana’s colonial identity (a complexity that is mirrored in both Annie and Ina’s 
construction of their white identities).  For Ana, the colonial woman, her identity is 
shaped by the social pressure to be a “proper” woman protecting and relinquishing 
her sexuality in socially acceptable ways, and by the control that the colonial men 
exercise over the colony.41   
The proper English woman (and the ideal white woman) must, in essence, 
emulate perfection.  Annie speculates that Ana—Mrs. Richards—“stood as straight 
as any tree” (AH 14), that she must have been “well-read [. . .] writing with a touch 
of the sublime, that nineteenth-century sense of grandeur, in her immaculate 
teacher’s handwriting” (AH 20).  The social code of the time for a proper woman 
dictated not women, but “ladies”: 
a word that has claimed so much from women trying to maintain it.  
the well-ironed linen, clean (lace at the cuffs, at the collar), well-
tailored dresses and wraps, the antimacassars, lace tablecloths, the 
christening bonnets.  Beyond that, a certain way of walking, of 
talking. and always that deference, that pleased attention to the men 
who gave them value, a station in life, a reason for existing.  lady, 
hlaēfdige, kneader of bread, mistress of a household, lady of the 
manor, woman of good family, woman of refinement and gentle 
manners, a woman whose conduct conforms to a certain standard of 
propriety. (AH 32) 
And Ana’s father, who thinks of her as a “Gentlewoman,” would be worried 
that she was living amongst such a “Rough Lot” (AH 55).  Ana is struck with guilt 
when she suggests dancing at the schoolhouse party, self-conscious immediately that 
“she had slipped, she a minister’s daughter.[ . . .] [S]he the school teacher, a model 
of propriety no doubt”(AH 72).  Ana is (almost) inescapably cognizant of her father’s 
(and the colonial Fathers’) ever-critical gaze at her actions and their lack of 
conformity to a certain “standard of propriety.” 
The pressure Ana feels to be the proper Englishwoman is suffocating, 
particularly when contrasted with the woman whom she feels herself to be.  Ana’s 
language moves between expressions of captivity and repression, and expressions of 
freedom and the desire to seek that freedom.  From the time when Ana first arrives at 
Hastings Mill on a ship, she is already “imagining herself free of history” (AH 14).  
Her time spent in the woods, a “colonial-free” zone, tempts her to lose her “English 
self” (AH 20) and she sees that she is “in the midst of freedom and yet not free, and 
could almost think how little is changed” (54).  In the latter revelation, Ana discloses 
the complexity of her plight—to gain freedom, she must not only lose her English 
self, but also her (Western) female self.  She laments, “she should have been born a 
man, she wanted too much.  She wanted to be free or at least freer than she was, than 
she had managed to be” (AH 104).  Gender and sexuality are as integral to Ana’s 
identity as is her status as a (white) colonist. Ana is not merely a colonist, but a 
female—and specifically, a “lady” colonist. 
And most certainly, Ana senses that her gender influences her status in the 
colony. Ultimately, the colony is a man’s domain from which she might benefit, but 
which she cannot transcend or escape.  The “city fathers” (28) are the “heroes” of the 
historical “roman / ce” (67).  The city fathers are the ones who construct the mould 
into which the “Proper Lady” should fit, a mould that Ana fears she does not fit into, 
both because of the way she thinks (desiring freedom) and because of her unmarried 
(although widowed) status.  Annie, reading into Ana, criticizes this mould: 
Proper, she says, Lady, capitalized, and it is barely sounded, the 
relationship between proper and property. [. . .] [S]he alone is without 
‘protection,’ as they would say.  subject then, to sly advances under 
the guise of moral detection, subject to agonizing […]subject to self-
doubt in a situation without clearly defined territory (because she is 
no one’s property, she is ‘free’ without being sexually free), she feels 
her differences from the other women.  (AH 32) 
Ana and Annie identify that within the colonial society, women are regarded as 
property (colonial law supports her observation), and to this notion is closely 
attached the understanding that as property, a woman’s sexuality is not her own.  
Women (and men) understand that  
getting a husband – or in some cases a ‘protector’ – is for her [the 
proper lady] the most important of undertakings.[ . . .] She will free 
herself from the parental home, from her mother’s hold, she will open 
up her future, not by active conquest but by delivering herself up, 
passive and docile, into the hands of a new master. (AH 95)42  
Ana’s social environment often seems charged with a sexual tension derived from 
the expectation that she will be both a “decent” lady, kept “well-covered, her 
sexuality hidden” (AH 33), and yet also a married woman (having sex), adding to the 
colony’s (white) population.43   
This tension is heightened by the implied sexual threat she perceives from 
many of the men in the colony, causing Ana, a young “available” woman, to become 
“preoccupied with the look the men give her.  so many men and so few women in 
that place” (AH 54).  And these “so many” men have come to Canada with very 
specific aims in mind, aims that reveal a great deal about the collective ethics and 
values held by the patriarchy.  The men seek to devour the land and its resources for 
the benefit of the colony, and are remorseful only that they did not arrive sooner to 
log “the country that hadn’t been touched” (AH 63).  This image hauntingly echoes 
that of a man eager to “deflower” a virgin, a disturbing and violent image.  When 
running afraid through the wood, she wonders what or whom she fears. After 
dismissing a fear of bears or cougars, not surprisingly, she thinks that perhaps it is 
men whom she fears: “madmen,” “drunken seamen,” or “Indians running amok” (AH 
96).  Ana muses about the choice presented to her: either she may remain single and 
“free” and a “secret friend perhaps to Birdie Stewart” and destined then to a stained 
reputation and constantly at the mercy of the unwanted sexual gaze of the colonial 
men (AH 108) or she may succumb to the pressures to remarry, uttered even by 
Susan Patterson who exclaims, “I cannot imagine a woman as good with children as 
you who would wish to remain childless” (AH 119).44   The colonial woman’s role is 
to support the colony’s men, and to expand the colony’s population through 
reproduction (and training of the children produced).  The colony encourages, then, a 
fear of madmen, drunken seamen, and Indian (non-White) men, effectively scaring 
women into marriage with white patriarchs. 
The social pressure to be a proper lady is not the only one that controls Ana’s 
movements and causes her anxiety regarding her desires that conflict with her 
perceived obligations.  The influences of religion (Christianity) are significant in 
Ana’s self-construction.  Marlatt brilliantly connects Ana’s religious influences to 
her father (the patriarchal influence, both in a real and symbolic sense), who is a 
clergyman.  Not only, then, does Ana feel obliged to answer to her father as a father 
figure, but figuratively, she also answers to the Christian God through him.  From 
scattered references, Annie interprets that Ana’s relationship with her father was 
bitter.  He was “no doubt overbearing, a clergyman with absolute authority as to the 
real (at least in his eyes), he must have been appalled at the thought of his daughter 
leaving him for the wilds of Canada” (AH 55). Although Ana’s independence and 
strong character are evident throughout the novel, I find this passage reveals much 
about Ana’s identity.  Ana’s father was overbearing, and even more, was an 
“absolute authority,” and yet—and yet—his daughter left him.  
This courageous act on her part is not enough, however, to wrench her Father 
from her conscience or her journal.  Although she “wrote for herself” (AH 20), she 
catches herself constantly “editing out” and “thinking about those possible others 
leaning over her shoulder as she writes” (AH 46), one of whom is, undoubtedly, her 
father.  When she struggles “to account for herself” and what she “might say,” she 
(sometimes) relies upon safe and conventional phrases such as “I am well” and 
“praise God,” and shortly thereafter addresses her father in her journal.  Because 
standard social conventions and deeply ingrained religious tenets are those things 
that first flood Ana’s mind when she sits down to a blank page, we see how 
significantly and thoroughly her father/Father has shaped her identity. And as Ana 
begins to explore her relative freedoms in Canada, her father’s critical voice haunts 
her: “Ana, my wayward child, you are straying close to animism, souls in trees and 
other pagan notions.  you, the daughter of a man of God.  explain yourself” (AH 84).  
Ana recognizes the word “pagan” as one that is used by the Christians to dismiss any 
knowledge or way of being that is outside of the colonial norm, a realization to 
which she comes when she contemplates Ruth’s fascination with the writing slate 
(AH 69).  Ana’s father articulates the utmost fear of the colonizing power: that the 
colonists will “go native,” shrugging off their Christian, Western, “civilized” culture 
in exchange for the “wild,” “uncontrolled / uncontrollable,” and uncivilized culture 
of the Native people.  In her role as widowed school teacher to “children familiar 
with eagles and bears, with killing accident, with salmonberry and vanilla leaf.  
children who knew nothing of  Blair’s Sermons, The Young Lady’s Friend, or 
Shelley and Keats” (AH 84), Ana creates for herself a subject position that is not 
Native, but that does undercut the colonial position that she is expected to occupy. 
Marlatt explores the colonial fear of what the colonists label as “wild” 
through the image of the bear.  Throughout the novel, both in Ana’s and Ina’s time 
frames, the often frightful spectre of encountering a bear looms for any woman who 
contemplates wandering outside of her prescribed boundaries and into “the woods” 
(both real and symbolic).  Ana frequently comments that she has been warned 
against bears and that she should fear bears, and yet she does not appear overly 
concerned about encountering one.  When she wakens from a dream, she has dreamt 
not of being chased or mauled by a bear, but rather, of having shared a path with one.  
Groggily, she remembers, “There were others there on other paths, there had been a 
bear” (AH 85).   Annie does speculate that Ana pulls her “black shawl more tightly 
around [herself] at the thought of bears,” but generally Ana seems more fearful of 
men and the Native people (AH 104).  Annie recalls her own lumbering memories of 
bears: 
sometimes they would raid our garbage cans at night and the phones 
would ring all up and down the block, there’s a bear at the Potts’, 
keep the dogs and kids inside.  excitement, peering through the 
windows out at streetlight pooling gravel.  so they were real then?  
shambling shadows, garbage eaters, only a little larger than the 
Newfoundland next door.  but something canny in them, resistant to 
attempts to scare them off, looking over their shoulders with 
contempt, four-footed men in shaggy suits intent on a meal.  (AH 18) 
While Annie’s bears are not tame, her description of them as “shambling shadows 
[and] garbage eaters” is less than fear-inspiring.  So what has happened to “the wild” 
(the unknown people, land, animals, and climate) of Canada, symbolized by the bear, 
that it has evolved for the white Canadian from an image of terror to one of 
suspicion, spectacle, wariness, and even pity?  I find the answer to this question in 
the history that Marlatt writes.  Ana suddenly finds herself eye to “small, wild” eye 
with a bear, not on a forest path, but “chained to [George Black’s] verandah” (AH 
103).  This bear was not consistent with the animal about which she had heard: 
Bears were said to be temperamental.  You never knew when one 
would rear up from behind a bush and slash out at you.  This one 
looked sad and rather mangy squatting in the refuse of its own 
droppings with a chain around its neck, its great claws negligent 
against the planking.  The way it sat on its haunches it could have 
been a child sitting on the floor with imaginary blocks, invisible 
letters.  Except that its eyes were the eyes of a beast—immeasurably 
sad.  Why would a man keep a bear?  It wasn’t tame but dying.  (AH 
103) 
We can trace key elements of Annie’s modern treatment of the bear back to this 
colonial (mis)treatment.  When the colonists first arrived, they greatly feared the 
bears and, furthermore, the male colonists used that fear to control the female 
members of their population.  For the “enterprising” and the “brave” men, however, 
control rather than fear of bears became desirable.  Hence the efforts of people such 
as George Black to restrict, confine, and alter the bear, trying to force it to serve his 
purposes.  Despite being captured, however, the bear was not “tame but dying;” the 
bear no longer walks as it had, but it passively resists its confinement by dying.  
Similarly, when colonists first arrived in Canada, they feared the Aboriginal people 
(and all other “foreign” aspects of Canada), generating for white people an identity 
characterized by the white heroic need to defeat the so-called savages.  Once traders 
and politicians and other “enterprising” and “brave” people tried to control the 
movements and rights of Aboriginal people through legislation, the white identity 
changed from that of conqueror to that of benevolent saviour.  Frankenberg identifies 
that the “classic colonialist view of the conquered society [is] a view of past glories 
[of conquered nations] and present degradations (from which, within a colonialist 
ideology, it is the conqueror’s duty to save the poor native)” (59).   
 Frankenberg expresses theoretically what Marlatt uncovers creatively in her 
work: the colonial process is ongoing, merely changing its appearance with more 
subtly-phrased legislature.  Annie’s exploration (excavation, exhumation) of Ana’s 
and Ina’s past is, in part, a self-discovery.  Ana’s difficulties with her identity, (lack 
of) freedom within a white, patriarchal society, expected treatment of the Other, and 
attempts to conform to repugnant social codes and expectations are all reflected in 
Annie’s reflection upon Ina, and sometimes even in her self-reflection.  Despite 
separation by time, the women’s narrative threads seem enmeshed: “Ana / Ina / 
whose story is this? / (the difference of a single letter) / (the sharing of a not)” (AH 
67). 
  
 
5.  Ina and Annie: The White Canadian as Emigrant and Immigrant 
 
By using Marlatt’s novel as a vehicle to explore constructions of Canadian 
whiteness, we can see that the characters of Ina and Annie seem to serve two 
particularly significant purposes.  First, because they are situated in more recent eras 
than Ana, we see their racial construction not in a historical, but in a contemporary 
context.  While the passages about Ana explore her colonial white identity, the 
passages on both Ina and Annie uncover a continuation of the colonization process, 
thereby substantiating critical assertions that Canadians currently live in neocolonial, 
rather than postcolonial times.  Ina and Annie, being both emigrant and immigrant, 
illustrate the relationships that white Canadians have with their ancestral origins and 
with their “home and native land.” The white Canadian is often torn between looking 
back and looking forward, an inner struggle that is personified in the two separate 
characters of Ina and Annie in Ana Historic. 
 Before looking more closely at the characters of Ina and Annie, I found it 
useful to identify how I, as a white Canadian, think about culture. There is a need to 
engage in such clarification because the word culture keeps surfacing in the writings 
of Frankenberg, Gonick, Steinberg, and Itwaru.  The culture with which people 
identify (and within which they construct their identity) is directly related to the 
social group with which those people identify.  Colonizers and emigrants are deeply 
connected to their country of origin, and therefore attempt to perpetuate its cultural 
practices.  Immigrants, conversely, are more interested in adopting the cultural 
practices of their new country’s citizens. 
 Frankenberg’s simple, yet crucial point, that culture is not static, will guide 
my discussion.  I first realized the impact of this notion when I considered 
Frankenberg’s statement that colonial discourse makes the “sharp distinction 
between modernity and tradition in which traditional societies [are] deemed 
repositories of culture and modern societies not so” (192).  A “traditional” society is, 
in the hegemonic view, a less civilized society, while a “modern” society refers to a 
civilized and Western society.  My experience is that white Canadians represent 
traditional and ethnic societies in anthropological terms, through media such as 
museum displays containing ancient costumes, weapons, and crockery, or textbooks 
detailing traditional customs and practices.  The problem with such representations is 
that the viewing (and presumably modern) society is encouraged to see the 
traditional society as an artifact—the modern society depicts traditional culture as 
something frozen in time, thereby circumventing any possibility of recognizing the 
traditional society as dynamic, evolving, and animate, and enabling such value-laden 
(and inaccurate) labels as “traditional” and “modern.” 
 Frankenberg’s ideas about static (and dynamic) culture are equally 
fascinating when applied, however, to white Canadian society, whose members are 
either immigrants or are the descendants of immigrants and whose government has 
made it a national mandate to keep this foremost in our consciousness.  Itwaru 
defines the immigrant in terms that are consistent with both Ina’s and Annie’s 
experience when arriving in Canada: 
The stranger categorized in the name and label “immigrant” is already 
invented as “immigrant,” a distinction which is also synonymous, 
upon arrival.  This person is no longer only a bearer of another 
history, but also has now become a particular other, the bearer of a 
label invented by the “host.”  This person has become the 
immigrant—this term of depersonalization which will brand her and 
him for the rest of their lives in the country of their adoption. (13-14) 
White Canadians, who boast to the world of their country’s multiculturalism and 
tolerance, succeed in creating amongst both white and non-white Canadians a 
“particular other” by labeling new Canadians “immigrant.”  This label forces both 
the “host” and the bearer of the label to sometimes be cognizant of the new 
Canadian’s “other history” and other (non-Canadian) culture.  Annie frequently 
connects images of her tea-breathed mother (AH 10) with the English and colonial 
cultural paraphernalia she brought with her to Canada: woolies and sweeties, hotties 
and hermits for tea (AH 23).  Their British and colonial language, and their cultural 
materials and practices, are enough to set both Ina and Annie apart from mainstream 
white Canada.  Despite being white, their status amongst other whites is lessened 
because they are culturally different from those who speak “Canadian”. 
 Marnina Gonick asserts that to be “Canadian” is to be “anglo”; to be blonde, 
blue-eyed, English-speaking, and white.  She also argues: 
Those claiming anglo identity have projected ethnicity into others and 
thereby naturalize their own as generically Canadian.  Thus, while 
multiculturalism may be a celebration of difference it is also a 
fossilization or romanticization of immigrant culture.  (96) 
Ina’s and Annie’s narratives indicate that apparently even those “claiming an anglo 
identity” are subject to exclusion from “true” Canadian society, for their accents, 
clothing, and food all state clearly to Canadian-born citizens that they are immigrants 
and not “native” Canadians.   
But I am eager to explore Gonick’s recognition of the Canadian practice of 
fossilizing or romanticizing immigrant culture.  Indeed, the multicultural movement 
tried to erase the negative history of difference in Canada, thus creating the 
(romantic) façade of a country comfortable with its multi-ethnic composition. 
Another consequence of this romanticization, however, was the fossilization of those 
ethnic cultures.  Steinberg suggests nonetheless that immigrants are “purveyors of 
authentic culture” (45). As different ethnic groups settled in Canada, they typically 
maintained many of their cultural practices.  While they may have settled amongst 
people of the same ethnic origin, however, they were no longer in daily contact with 
their cultural homeland, and therefore their cultural pool was not fed by a spring of 
fresh cultural input from its original source.    Perhaps it is for this reason that recent 
immigrants do not always feel welcomed as Canadians; the immigrant’s “authentic 
culture” reminds “native” Canadians that their ancestors are not of Canada.  The 
ideal Canadian, to qualify Gonick’s definition, is one who identifies with an anglo 
identity, and who demonstrates no signs of unnaturalized “ethnicity.”  For Mrs. Ana 
Richards, her English accent and culture would have been an asset for her in terms of 
claiming greater social status than whites of other ethnicities (such as the Scottish or 
Irish).  But after the initial phase of colonization in Canada, any accent or other signs 
of difference potentially reduced one’s social status. 
 While Canadians are certainly guilty of othering immigrants because of their 
foreign culture, those immigrants may sometimes be equally eager to maintain a 
distinction between themselves and their new countrymen.  Ina, a depressed emigrant 
housewife in the 1950s, seems constantly at odds with her new homeland.  When she 
is not lecturing Annie on the superiority of British language and customs, she is 
“criticizing [Canada] for its lack of culture” (AH 22).  Annie recalls that “looking 
smart was part of [Ina’s] identity [. . .] (‘Canadian women have no pride -- they look 
such frights on the street with their hair up in curlers’)” (AH 57), and later on, Ina 
chastises Annie with “you have no taste,” indicating her disproval of her immigrant 
daughter’s newly acquired Canadian ways (AH 57).  For Ina, her perceived class 
superiority to that of her fellow Canadians contributes greatly to her identity as a 
white Canadian emigrant, even though Ina, her husband, and daughters suffered a 
tremendous financial loss when immigrating to Canada.  Annie reports that Ina is 
reduced to spending hours “shopping for bargains, shopping department store 
basements or poring over Sears catalogues, dismissing things that looked ‘cheap,’ 
vainly trying to clothe [her daughters] with the class [she] had in the tropics where 
[her] clothes were handsewn by Chinese tailors” (AH 33).   Ina’s class obsession is 
not unrealistic, for certainly, wealth and social refinement are two of the criteria by 
which the “true whites” are selected and all others are tossed roughly down the rungs 
of the social ladder. Class distinctions may determine “shades of white” among 
whites, however Marilyn Frye argues that “[people of color] do not generally 
indicate that class differences among white people make much difference to how 
people of color experience them” (Willful Virgin 159).  Frye’s comment is consistent 
with my suspicion that regardless of most (all?) variations of white identity, non-
whites experience whiteness as fairly monolithic.   
Ina constantly distances herself from “Canadians,” emphasizing that she does 
not identify herself as one. Annie remembers her mother’s “dictionary, [her] 
immigrant weapon. [. . .] [R]eal? [she] said, what is ‘real cute’?  Canadians don’t 
know how to speak proper English.  real is an adjective, look” (AH 17).    The irony, 
however, is that Ina has not arrived in Canada after a life in England but, rather, after 
having been raised in colonial outposts where her parents were stationed. Annie 
speculates on her mother’s most private thoughts and desires: 
what did you dream, Ina, in your golfing skirt, demure knees, a pretty 
face they said at The Club, something immeasurably sad within those 
eyes.  what did you imagine of a future so far away from your 
parents’ house in the tropics, their dogs, their servants, their endless 
games of Ouija at the mahogany table, tipped-up sherry glasses 
gliding mysteriously under fingers’ touch, letter by letter spelling out 
your fate: “you will die insane in a foreign country.”  you were 
already in a foreign country where you didn’t belong.  You had 
already been left in one, left at boarding school in a country they 
called “home” which was nothing like the India you remembered. 
[ . . .] [T]his was the life [in Canada] you chose, opening up your 
future to it so your children wouldn’t have to leave, so they could 
grow up in a country to which they belonged.  (italics mine AH 98) 
Ina’s English identity was founded on an already removed and romanticized 
conception of being English, an identity that influenced her daughters’ self-
perceptions.  That Ina remembers a certain “India,” indicates that she felt a degree of 
identification with that country, even though she was in a “foreign country where 
[she] didn’t belong.”45 Quite obviously, Ina struggled with her own identity and 
ethnicity, and with which country she should call “home.”  I find it mysterious, then, 
that Annie believes her mother brought them to Canada, because it would be a 
“country to which they belonged.”  Why did Ina try to instill in her daughters her 
English mannerisms, values, and language—“o the cultural labyrinth of our 
inheritance, mother to daughter to mother” (AH 24) — if she wanted them to become 
convincing Canadians?  Why did Ina feel her daughters would belong to Canada 
when she was always a foreigner, in every country she resided?  Did she really want 
them to become Canadian when she constantly instilled in them a paranoia of setting 
foot outside of the house into the “wild” territory that was beyond her control? 
 So many of Annie’s memories of her mother reflect Ina’s preoccupation with 
appearance, image, and reputation, a symptom of Ina’s identity crises, what Dyer and 
Frye both identify as the struggle to succeed at whiteness/whiteliness from the 
position as a woman in white culture. Countless hours of Ina’s life are spent trying to 
convey the image of a perfect, refined, proper English woman, just as countless other 
white, middle-class, North American wives and mothers of the 1950s tried with 
equal fervency to present an image of domestic perfection.  In her struggle with her 
identity, Ina reveals how she is both “colonist” and “colonized,” a complicated 
subject position.  While Ina desperately clutches at her English parentage as proof of 
social superiority, and while her efforts to appear well-to-do become a full-time job, 
the very middle-class people she tries to meet are the same people that set the gate-
keeping and set the nearly unattainable standards that cause Ina tremendous 
psychological distress.  In a post mortem address to her mother, Annie identifies 
Ina’s greatest internal disjunction between who she believes herself to be, and who 
she believes she is supposed to be: 
you never lived alone.  you went from your parents’ colonial house to 
boarding school, then back to your parents and into marriage with 
your own servants. always you lived surrounded by voices: quarrels, 
dreams, demands, the crises of others in several different languages.  
you never lived alone until you came here and found yourself 
suddenly placed with empty days on your hands, weeks and months 
of days alone in a house with all its chores crying out for you to do.  
the voices came from inside now, the way you whipped yourself into 
a frenzy of activity in the face of nothing.[ . . .] [Y]ou were always 
home where your place was, with the sawdust furnace, with the wood 
stove for heat, hanging clothes anywhere you could to dry them. 
filling up the silence with songs.  black working songs, slave songs.  
(AH 137)46
 
This passage reveals not only the dramatic transition Ina made from her childhood to 
her new Canadian home, but also Ina’s desperate attempt, like that of the other 
homemakers of the 1950s, to imagine a perfect domestic sphere.  Ina faces far more 
obstacles in this regard than her white, middle-class counterparts, because she does 
not have the same financial resources as those women.  Ina’s chores are made more 
tedious by this fact, because not only can she not afford domestic help, but neither 
can she afford the types of amenities (such as an electric clothes dryer) that might 
make her workload lighter. 
And the same social expectations that make clear to Ina her failings as an 
aspiring white, anglo-middle-class woman are also responsible for medicalizing 
Ina’s psychological response to her situation, punishing her for being incapable of 
completing the impossible task of forming a cohesive and acceptable (white female) 
identity from the myriad of emigrant experiences that form her sense of self. Annie 
details Ina’s struggle: 
That’s your voice, Ina, lucid and critical, seeing through the 
conventions that surrounded you.  and though you saw through them, 
you still didn’t know what to do with the fear that found you alone on 
the far side of where you were ‘supposed’ to be.  wrong, therefore.  
guilty of  ‘going to [sic] far.’  (AH 135) 
Ina, the patient, is “clearly identified as the ‘sick’ member of the family and the 
family is reassured they don’t need to feel guilty or in any way responsible” (AH 
145).  While the white Canadian population has been responsible for countless acts 
of inhumanity against non-whites, Ina is a reminder that even those who wear the 
skin like a consciously-donned article of clothing, and try to “perfect whiteness,” are 
not immune from the normalizing reach of white patriarchal medicine. 
 Unlike her mother, Annie, through her immigrant perspective, is embarrassed 
by the ethnicity that sets her apart from her school friends, and seeks to shrug off that 
ethnicity in exchange for what she perceives as Canadian-ness. To become Canadian, 
for Annie, is to look forward and to embrace something new, but, at least for a time, 
it also seems to demand that she sacrifice her history in exchange.  Annie’s narrative 
thread that carries throughout and ultimately gives the novel the frame upon which 
the other narratives are stretched, repeatedly reveals the tension she feels as a woman 
whose identity is always shifting.   
 Annie’s language, interests, studies, and personal life are all discordant with 
the life-path that Ina had originally chosen for her daughter, one that supports the 
white narrative.  Rather than employ the formal, standard English preferred by her 
mother, Annie’s (and Marlatt’s) narrative flouts all grammatical conventions.47  
Sentences do not begin with capitals (and what are presented as sentences are not 
always sentences); punctuation is used effectively, but not as a reader and Ina might 
anticipate; and the diction is clearly “Canadian” (while Annie treats Ina’s English 
colloquialisms with bemusement).  Annie takes an interest in the details of historical 
Canadian documents, unlike Ina who was “never interested in any past outside of 
England’s” (AH 22).  And when her interest leads to academic work on the subject, 
Annie imagines Ina’s critical voice chastising a methodology that “indulg[es] in 
outright speculation.  [that] isn’t history, it’s pure invention,” accusing Annie of 
“simply making things up, out of a perverse desire to obscure the truth” (AH 55).  In 
every sense, Annie seems to fight her mother and her traditional, English colonial 
ways.   
 Yet the battle is not silent, nor is it won; despite all of Annie’s efforts to hack 
away her English roots (with both Indian and Malay influences), evidence of her first 
self and her allegiance to Ina, her mother, continually betray Annie.48 Much of this 
evidence appears before we even have finished the first twenty pages of the book.  
The contradictions, so heavily peppered in the first part of the novel, alert us to 
Annie’s fractured sense of self.  Seemingly simple and innocent slips such as 
referring to Ina as “Mummy” (rather than the conventional North American, “Mom”) 
reveal that Ina’s English is deeply imprinted in Annie’s mind (AH 11).  When Annie 
recalls her mother labeling her a “tomboy,” Annie clarifies this label by exploring 
characters from classical English literature such as Robin Hood and Lancelot (AH 
13).  Annie also adopts her mother’s love of libraries, books, and  
historical novels, family history with its lurid stretches shaping the 
destiny of a nation.  consoled by this, that the familial, the mundane, 
could actually have historic proportions?  kings and queens in bed 
with you of an afternoon.  rain, rain.  (AH 16)   
Annie also tries to emulate Ina’s values and desires by “stay[ing] in the house as a 
good girl should” (AH16), “follow[ing] the plotline through, the story [Ina] had 
[Annie] enact” (AH 16), and “being initiated into a world of middle-class romance” 
(AH 97).   
 Annie the immigrant, however, tries to forget all these parts of herself so that 
she might belong to her new country.49 Her desire to wipe out that part of her identity 
that might differentiate her from the (apparently) homogenous, white Canadian 
culture is consistent with Gonick’s assertion that the “fashioning of [a homogenous, 
white, English] national identity involve[s] a suppression of knowledge” (100).  The 
suppression of knowledge to which Gonick refers is not only, as in Annie’s case, the 
suppression of certain aspects of a self on a private level, but also a more systemic 
suppression of historical events (and more pointedly, historical injustices enacted by 
one group upon another).  Richard, Annie’s husband, reminds her that “one missing 
piece [of history] can change the shape of the whole picture.” Annie responds, “but 
i’m no longer doing my part looking for missing pieces.  at least not missing facts.  
not when there are missing persons in all this rubble” (AH  134).  The missing 
persons are the “a-historic” ones who have no “speaking part” (AH 139), people 
such as Ana Richards who have been entirely buried, except for one sentence, under 
a mountain of patriarchal historical documents and details.  And Annie refers to all 
the women just like Ana Richards who have also been lost under historical “rubble,” 
obscuring the various components that went into the foundation of Canada as a 
whole.50  Yet the missing pieces are also critical: the immigrants who have either 
voluntarily left behind, or felt it necessary to forsake, the pieces of themselves 
connected to their ancestral lands also erase pieces of the whole picture of Canada.  
Immigrants may push parts of themselves to the backs of their minds, but they still 
bring those “pieces” to Canada and add it to our cultural canvas.  Eakin argues that 
“culture is the silent partner in the transaction” of negotiating a sense of selfhood,” 
even, presumably, if the people negotiating their selfhood try to ignore or forget that 
part of their identities (“Relational Selves” 72). 
 How useful, however, is it to speak of Canada as a country of colonizers, 
immigrants, and emigrants, when many of its people are second- or third- generation 
Canadians and have no memories of the “old country,” its culture, or even its 
language?  Canada is a country inhabited by actual colonizers, immigrants, and 
emigrants, but even those whites who were born in Canada can symbolically occupy 
one or more of these positions (as well as countless other positions constituted by 
sexuality or gender).   I would like to consider these terms in light of Frankenberg’s 
assertion that culture is not static.  The colonizer’s, the emigrant’s, and the 
immigrant’s cultural practices are no longer fed directly from their homeland.  But 
their culture is a part of them that then evolves in their new country and is, then, as in 
the case of Ina and Annie, passed from one generation to the next.  Culture and 
ethnicity are not “things” that are brought into Canada in suitcases and hatboxes, to 
be kept on a shelf and carefully brought out for special occasions, yellowing and 
becoming brittle over time.  Instead, culture and ethnicity live in the people who 
come to this country and then change as these people interact with one another and 
with people already here.  Each person’s “piece” then, is a critical part of 
understanding the greater puzzle of Canadian whiteness.  An individual may or may 
not acknowledge that his/her ethnic background has had any significant impact on 
his/her life, but that ethnic group has contributed to the formation of (white) Canada, 
and brings with it a history that should not be ignored.  Zoe’s character succinctly 
encapsulates the status of the contemporary white Canadian when she touches the 
back of Annie’s hand and says, “that’s the trouble with history—it never is [history]” 
(AH 132).  To whitewash our colonial past in textbooks, classrooms and 
conversations, 51 to disregard our immigrant composition, to ignore our immigrant 
imaginations is to naively believe that history forgotten will remain in the past.  But 
history never is past, and to lose sight of this inevitability is, as many have reminded 
us, to condemn ourselves to make the same mistakes.  Although born in Canada to 
parents born in Canada, I am, in part and at different times, the colonizer, the 
sentimental emigrant, and the forward-looking immigrant. 
 So where, after this discussion of emigrants and immigrants, do we position 
white Canadians in regard to their ethnicity and cultural heritage?  On the side of our 
multicultural efforts, represented by the emigrants who choose to look back to the 
old country and remember the old ways, I identify a superficial fascination with 
static forms of culture, a fascination that is counter-productive when striving to 
improve race relations in Canada.  In contrast, there are Canadians, represented by 
immigrants, who try to remedy this superficial fascination by aligning themselves 
with a singular national identity (Canadian), and who think about Canada’s political 
and social future believing in national commonality among citizens.  But this 
position is also potentially dangerous because whites are at risk of forgetting that 
Canada’s current social hierarchies have developed out of decades of racial and 
ethnic tensions.  Of course, no white individual believes entirely in one position or 
the other, but instead manifests characteristics of both the emigrant and the 
immigrant.   
As represented by Ana, the Canadian white identity, whether forward- or 
backward-looking, is founded in the colonial history of our country.  But Canadian 
colonial history (yet again) is not past—an hour spent in a high school social-studies 
class, ten minutes spent reading the newspaper, or time spent listening to political 
commentary on a radio program reveals that colonialism is anything but in the past.  
Perhaps this is why issues of race, ethnicity, and identity are so topical and so 
sensitive in Canada.  To interrogate white Canadian identity and to understand its 
social role in the country, whites must, like the emigrant, look back from where they 
have traveled, and recognize that their “heads are full of other people’s words” (AH 
81).   But whites can also recognize, like the immigrant, that there is something 
“without quotation marks” (AH 81).  Recorded history, such as the British Columbia 
history that is interspersed among the passages about Ana, Ina, and Annie, is that 
which lies within quotation marks. That history clearly serves a colonial and 
patriarchal master, whereas the histories of Ana, Ina, and Annie, as imagined and 
written by Annie, are narratives that are without quotation marks.  These stories have 
not been told before, that are grounded in the colonial story yet require imagination 
to make up their absence in the pages of “real” history.   Likewise, whites can learn 
colonial history, yet should also, through alternate sources of information, seek to 
imagine and fill in those pages that were never written. They can chose to live in and 
by “history and imagination” (italics mine, AH 139). 
Ana and Annie apply both their knowledge of history, and their imaginations 
as they literally construct their identities, through writing.  Ana rails against her 
father and the patriarchy he represents, while Annie constantly tries to untangle her 
self from the historical webs in the library archives (and in her mother’s history).  
Marlatt clearly expresses to readers that the process of “writing themselves” is 
neither easy nor apolitical for either Ana or Annie.   As mentioned in my 
introduction, some critics of life writing believe that the writing self is “autonomous 
and unified” and that the “essential core of being transcends the outward signs of 
environmental and social conditioning,” while others assert that she is “subject as in 
subject of the state, or subject to the law” (Rice and Waugh 123).  In Ana Historic, as 
in many of her other works, Marlatt does not restrict the theoretical underpinnings of 
her creative work to any one school of thought.  In Ana Historic, in particular, 
Marlatt rejects the notion that the (writing) self can be either “autonomous and 
unified” or exclusively a “subject,” that is subject to external forces.  Rather, the 
writing self is suspended somewhere between these two ideas, at times swaying more 
in one direction than the other. 
Ana and Annie assert their autonomous selves through the act of recording 
their words on paper, despite self-conscious musings that “no one would ever follow 
that sentence” (AH 86).  Autonomy, Annie interprets, is found in Ana’s act of 
“writing what would become a record,” and when “her hand hovered, her mind 
jumped. [and] she could have imagined anything and written it down as real 
forever—“ (AH 29-30).  By both recording a voice that was not typically privileged 
in Ana’s time, and by controlling and manipulating and even imagining what is 
recorded, Ana (and Annie) generate a counter-narrative, a narrative that subverts the 
“history [that] is the real [i.e. widely accepted] story” (AH 28). And Annie, by 
finding Ana in the historical rubble and digging her story free, becomes the “I / my” 
who is “laying down tracks with facts rescued against the obscurity of bush” (AH 
29), the “I” and “my” reclaiming a lost story.52 Ana, Annie, Ina and Marlatt caution 
the reader that traditional history “is the historic voice (voice over), elegiac, 
epithetic.  a diminishing glance as the lid is closed firmly and finally shut.  that was 
her.  summed up.  Ana historic” (AH 48).  The cooperative act shared by Ana and 
Annie, however, is not the recording of traditional history, with its emphasis on 
recording “fact (f)act.  the f stop of act.  a still photo in the ongoing cinerama” (AH 
31). Rather, they share in (re)creating or (re)presenting people, experiences, and 
emotions, in “imagining” all the elements that are missing from traditional history.  
Ana’s autonomous act of life writing is not valued by the archivists, however, 
as are the stacks of newspaper articles from the same period.  Annie fears that 
because life writing “is not history” (proper),   
this is why, perhaps, they think her journal suspect at the archives.  
“inauthentic,” fictional possibly, contrived later by a daughter who 
imagined (how ahistoric) her way into the unspoken world of her 
mother’s girlhood. [. . .] [A]nd her daughter?  we know nothing of 
her, this possible interpreter of her mother’s place in that world.  it’s 
hardly a record of that world, is it?  no, it’s Mrs. Richard’s private 
world, at least that’s what they call it.  that’s why it’s not historical – a 
document, yes, but not history. (AH 30-31) 
The authenticity and value of the journal and its contents are scrutinized from 
multiple perspectives: Annie, the people at the archives, and even Ana question the 
(woman’s) journal’s “authenticity.” Marlatt aptly recognizes that no identity, no 
matter how strong and autonomous, is impervious to outside influences: any story 
has multiple voices, even if there is only one storyteller.  Annie predicts that her 
husband Richard will scoff: “this is nothing, i imagine him saying.  meaning 
unreadable.  because this nothing is a place he doesn’t recognize, cut loose from 
history and its relentless progress towards some end.  this is undefined territory, 
unaccountable.  and so on edge” (AH 81).  Richard invalidates not only the 
“accountability” of Ana’s story and Annie’s efforts to recuperate that story, but 
indirectly, also invalidates Annie’s efforts to reconstruct her own identity through 
her ongoing remembrance of and literary dialogue with her mother, Ina.  Annie’s 
reading of Ana’s life writing (and then her own life writing) cannot avoid being 
influenced by the negative opinions she gathers from those around her.  Even at the 
time that Ana writes her journal, she, too, wavers under the critical gaze of another’s 
eyes: “in the line that is not hers, that she composes in imagination for her father’s 
benefit.  her real story begins where nothing is conveyed” (AH 83). Marlatt teaches 
that even in life writing—writing one’s life and writing for one’s life— the most 
resolutely autonomous self is challenged and affected by the people, values, and 
social climate surrounding that individual.  Because Marlatt foregrounds aspects of 
both the autonomous and the subjected identity in creating her characters, the manner 
in which those characters construct their white identities becomes equally rich and 
multilayered. 
Annie’s investment in recovering Ana’s diary is as much personal as it is 
political; this act, in part, metaphorically represents how the modern white identity is 
founded in the colonial.  While Ana’s world sometimes seems so foreign to Annie, at 
other times, Annie’s voice actually seems to blend with Ana’s, making some of their 
experiences shared.  When Annie notes, for example, that Ana feels “ab-original,” I 
puzzle over whether this is an experience that Annie attributes to Ana, or whether 
this feeling is indeed one that they both share since their identities cross over in that 
they are both white women in a patriarchal society.  Undoubtedly, Annie deeply 
identifies with Ana, feeling “as if she could reach out and touch her, those lashes cast 
down over blue (brown?) eyes” (AH 45). To what degree Annie’s empathy for Ana 
influences Annie’s reading of Ana’s life story, however, is difficult to determine. 53
Indeed, just as Marlatt strives to blur the distinctions between time frames, so 
she blends the actual characters into one another for fleeting moments.  Beyond that, 
however, Marlatt takes a truly radical leap and blurs the distinctions between her 
own life story and those of her characters.  While many writers before her have 
employed the strategy of combining personal experience with fictitious writing, 
Marlatt draws the reader’s attention to this strategy. Rather than merely using her 
personal experiences as an unseen brick foundation upon which her story is 
constructed, Marlatt takes individual bricks and inserts them in the very walls of her 
story, making them conspicuous and impossible to ignore.  Marlatt prods the reader 
to consciously recognize that the boundaries between the autobiographical and 
fiction, are not clear.  
When starting this project, I naturally learned as much about Marlatt’s 
biography as possible. When I then started (re)reading Ana Historic, Taken, 
Readings from the Labyrinth, Ghostworks, and other collections of poetry, I quickly 
recognized transformed pieces of Marlatt’s life in each of these works.  In Ana 
Historic, in particular, though, Marlatt deliberately makes these fragments more 
difficult to separate out.  She assumes the role of master arborist, grafting the 
branches that are multiple voices, to create an interdependent narrative.   Her skills 
are so deft that ultimately her reader struggles to identify the original 
(autobiographical) narrative from the imagined narratives.  I became acutely aware 
of this when I tried to determine where Annie is raised.  Ina, we know, lived with her 
colonial parents in India (as did Marlatt’s mother), but Annie also refers to her 
mother’s clothes having been “handsewn by Chinese tailors” (AH 33).  If referring to 
her mother’s adult life, then does she imply that Annie was raised in a country like 
Malaysia, as she was?  
 Marlatt, I believe, makes the reading of the life writing(s) difficult for two 
reasons.  First, she forces her reader to become alert and critical; a passive reader 
will not successfully reach the end of Ana Historic.  We are constantly prodded to 
ask who is speaking, from what context, under what influences, and to what purpose. 
Second, Marlatt wants to emphasize that to try to compartmentalize our ideas is 
dangerous: instead, we should look for the crossings-over, back and forth, of 
imagination into fact, the objective into the subjective, and the colonial into the 
neocolonial.  The layers of poetry and prose, imagination, fiction, fact, history, 
anecdote, masculinity, femininity and others, weave to create a novel that 
exemplifies the very process and struggle of constructing one’s (white and female) 
identity.  
 
  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Shortly before I started writing this conclusion, I was browsing our campus 
bookstore and happened upon Ashley W. Doane and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s edited 
book, White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism. Within that collection of 
essays, I encountered Margaret Andersen’s “Whitewashing Race: A Critical 
Perspective on Whiteness.”  Andersen concedes that while whiteness studies broaden 
the analysis of “racial, gender, and class stratification” beyond the analysis of 
“people of color as victims,” she still finds something “fundamentally disturbing 
about the growth of whiteness studies” (21).   
I stopped reading for a moment. Did I really want to read the rest of the 
article?  What if Andersen’s critique undid my entire thesis project?  How could I, in 
good conscience, submit the project if someone reasonably argued that whiteness 
studies were in any way dangerous?  After all I had, after reading texts such as 
Roxanna Ng’s Anti-racism, Feminism, and Critical Approaches to Education, come 
to regard conceptualizations such as multiculturalism as an outdated, useless, and 
even harmful.  I read ahead, however, bracing myself for Andersen’s critique.  
Throughout the essay, Andersen makes many excellent and perceptive points, most 
of which are encapsulated in the question, “Whose interests are served by the study 
of whiteness?” (Andersen 32).  Andersen charges: 
For many, participation in whiteness literature is itself a new form of 
privilege.  Joe Kincheloe and Shieley Steinberg state that the key goal 
of whiteness studies is “creating a positive, proud, attractive, 
antiracist white identity that is empowered to travel in and out of 
racial/ethnic circles with confidence and empathy.  (32) 
As evidence that whiteness studies may be of more benefit to whites than to those 
groups that have had to endure whiteness, Andersen cites such concerns as whiteness 
studies being an avenue by which the “dominant” voice can sneak back to the centre, 
negating people’s real-world racialized experiences by declaring race as merely 
social construct, reducing whites to a monolithic category, or shifting focus from 
race to whiteness and from racism to “white privilege.”  She also finds problematic 
the methodology in whiteness studies resulting in writing that is “narrative, 
autobiographical, and textual,” in which “little connection is made [. . .] to the 
operation of the state and economy in producing racial categories, since the focus 
tends to be overwhelmingly personal” (27). 
 Almost entirely, I agree that Andersen’s trepidation about whiteness studies 
demands serious consideration; however, at the same time the work accomplished in 
whiteness studies should not be tossed carelessly away.  While it has been my 
experience that when talking about racism, the focus always drifts to those who are 
victims and not perpetrators of racism, I must also concede that in the wake of multi-
cultural and anti-racist trends that put the nonwhite subject in “the limelight,” 54 I 
have heard too many cries of “reverse discrimination” (creating a white victim) and 
of “preferential treatment” (for non-whites).  These complaints, indeed, 
communicate to me an unwillingness on the part of white subjects to share the 
stage—academic, critical, theoretical—with nonwhite subjects.  Yet I am not willing 
to concede that whiteness should not be placed centre stage (or perhaps more 
appropriately, under a microscope).  While certainly to do so risks allowing 
whiteness and white voices once again to dominate discourse on race, whiteness 
cannot be left unexamined. As an invisible force (even if it is only invisible to whites 
themselves), whiteness will continue to permeate every nook and cranny of 
mainstream Canadian society.  If we uncover the creature beneath the spell of 
invisibility, however, perhaps that creature will lose some of its insidious power. 
Andersen’s concern, then, that the critics are making a conceptual shift from 
“racism” to “whiteness” can be (guardedly) found acceptable if the point of that shift 
is to offer a critique of that previously unexamined whiteness not only in the spirit 
of, but also prompting its undoing. 
I agree, also, that exploring whiteness (or any race) merely as social 
construction and failing to acknowledge the implications of that construction on real 
lives is a terribly convenient strategy used by (white) theorists, whether knowingly or 
unknowingly employed.  This strategy not only allows whiteness theorists to focus 
on their own “race” rather than on the more complex issues that arise where “races” 
interact and conflict, but more importantly, distances both theorists and readers from 
the very real ways in which racial differences manifest themselves.  A great deal of 
my treatment of whiteness theory and Marlatt’s text has focused on race as a social 
construction: Andersen reminds me that if I were to complete further work in the 
area, I should then extend my theoretical groundwork to more practical 
considerations, perhaps by taking up work in an applied social science such as 
sociology.  I qualify that statement by alluding to future work, because even after 
reading Andersen’s essay, I believe that a racial identity is constructed on individual, 
community, and social levels.  Theorizing race as a social construction is not a 
fruitless endeavour, but neither is it the only way to understand racial issues.   
I do not agree, however, with Andersen’s assertion that whiteness studies 
grow out of a conceptual shift away from race or from the “ways that white privilege 
functions without having to name anyone a racist” (26).  I think that whiteness 
studies encourage whites to see themselves as racialized creatures, and then to see 
how they contribute to the racialization of other groups and how whites reap the 
unearned advantages of their racialization.  Further, although Andersen finds the 
personal writing in whiteness theory inadequate or self-indulgent, I think that the 
anecdotal writing marks the most significant acknowledgement of the racist white—
the writer recognizes and admits to his/her own racist composition rather than hiding 
behind a mask of objectivity.55  Andersen agrees that “self-criticism must accompany 
white people’s antiracist work [because] too often white progressives leave their own 
attitudes and behaviors unexamined while working against racism” (33).  Most 
certainly, antiracist efforts must move beyond the personal, but to be authentic they 
must be grounded in personal change.  Further, the theorists who take risks, who 
make themselves vulnerable by writing their own racial narrative, not only avoid 
deflecting responsibility to another party but also generate an environment that 
promotes and encourages other (white) theorists to take the same types of risks.   
My answer to Andersen’s question, “Whose interests are being served by 
whiteness studies?,” is that the answer lies in the response to another question: 
“What has motivated the development of whiteness studies”?   Much to what would 
be Andersen’s chagrin if she knew of my response, I am certain, I choose to answer 
this question with a personal narrative.  When I undertook this project, I will confess 
that my motives were twofold.   I was, indeed, anxious to work on a subject that was 
relatively new.   For professional survival, I felt I needed to become knowledgeable 
in an area in which there were fewer experts.  But considerations for my professional 
future entered my mind only after years of studying, writing about, and working 
against racism.  Canadian racism was an issue that I had addressed in my first-year 
essays and even as early as grade-school reports.  What motivated me as a ten-year-
old child to try to understand and address racism was not professional but human 
interest.  Things in my world were not right, and I needed to understand why and 
then try to effect change.  I reflect on those papers and arguments I engaged in over 
the years and marvel at how my thinking has changed, and only hope that I will 
marvel equally at the change in Canadian society I experience in the years to come.  
My own motivation for entering into whiteness studies is grounded in a desire not to 
“creat[e] a positive, proud, attractive, antiracist white identity that is empowered to 
travel in and out of racial/ethnic circles” but to alter my own thinking and behaviour, 
and further, to share what I have learned with other people.56  Whiteness studies are 
motivated by a white desire to address the failings of white culture, and so, ideally, I 
would hope that everyone who is negatively affected by unexamined white culture 
(whites and non-whites) will find their “interests served” by its interrogation.   
Andersen’s difficulties with the trend to personalize whiteness studies pivot 
upon her concern that the critics declare their work finished once they have engaged 
in a personal interrogation of their racial identity.  “But politics does not stop there,” 
she cautions (33).  I agree; indeed, not until I take my personal investigation and 
apply it to my family, community, and teaching, does my work become political.  
But this application has very naturally progressed from my work.  The way I parent 
and teach my children is heavily influenced by what I have learned in whiteness 
studies.  I respond publicly, via avenues such as the editorial column in the local 
newspaper, to race issues in our city, province, and country.  My teaching in first-
year English tutorials and my work at the Teaching and Learning Centre at my 
university reflect all that I have learned, grounded in the interrogation of my own 
racial identity.  While the process, over years, of studying racism and discovering my 
own racial identity has been fraught with ignorance, naiveté, and misconceptions, my 
motive has always been to battle racism in my country.  Whiteness studies has taught 
me that that battle must be joined within the white community and within the white 
self (my self), and that that community must recognize its privilege and systemic 
practices of perpetuating and initiating racist social and economic hierarchies. 
In her novel Ana Historic, and in her critical writing in Readings From the 
Labyrinth, Marlatt executes the leap from personal to political that Andersen 
demands from work around (racial) identity studies.  When I read Ana Historic, I 
was not looking for evidence of a white identity in the characters—in any piece of 
literature written by white authors, evidence of white identity is guaranteed.   What 
intrigues me about Marlatt’s writing is her awareness, revealed through life writing 
and the identities created during that process, of the constructed elements of white 
racial and cultural identities.  Marlatt’s political action, based upon her personal and 
cultural understanding, manifests itself in her writing, which is her political action.  
Literature, while a welcome and comforting companion on a long train ride or dreary 
autumn day, can also be uncomfortable and a catalyst for change.   
Marlatt’s writing is a homemade “cloth of connectedness”: her writing is 
homemade because she does not use language as a bolt of fabric that is ready to be 
applied to a factory-made pattern, but instead a raw resource that must be worked 
until it is appropriate for her purposes.  Through her writings, she explores, reveals, 
and constructs the identity of the individual, but also examines how that individual 
relates and is connected to other “i’s,” whether they are found in history, the 
community, family, or her personal relationships.  She walks the “shared ground” of 
the “i” and the “we,” giving power to the unwritten, the unrecognized, and the 
unspoken, especially through Annie’s character, who creates a life-writing story 
within a life-writing story.   
As an immigrant, Marlatt has had the advantage of seeing Canada both as an 
outsider and as a Canadian citizen.  She has known both the discomfort of not quite 
belonging, and the satisfaction of becoming an integral part of many Canadian 
“communities” (writing, lesbian, feminist, academic, and others).  And because of 
her reflection upon her colonial childhood, she is confronting and working through 
issues such as colonial guilt and racial inequality.  Marlatt’s knowledge and 
experience in all of these issues forms, textures, and colours her constructions of 
identity.  She is aware of her white identity, and how it is shaped by her childhood, 
culture, community, family, relationships and by non-whites to whom she is 
connected.  Using the voices of Ana, the colonial settler, Ina, the emigrant, and 
Annie the immigrant-now-Canadian, Marlatt reveals the complex and ongoing 
history and social dynamics that determine that white Canadian identity and 
contribute to current neocolonial “race” relations.  While reflective and personal, 
Ana Historic is also a theoretical and political agent of social change. 
 
  
 
                                                          
1 Speaking about the accessibility of feminist literary criticism, Andrea Lebowitz 
argues: 
A most basic aspect of the feminist literary critic’s commitment is to 
audience, and to the definition of that audience.  I do not believe that 
our work should be addressed only to others engaged in literary 
studies.  Rather it should be accessible to all those who read, cry with, 
rage at, enjoy and learn from literature.  And happily, there are many 
such readers.  The distinctions between serious and popular literature 
so dear to the academic’s heart are mercifully absent for the non-
academic reader, who cheerfully keeps her Doris Lessing piled on the 
bedside table with the latest Harlequin romance.  Early in the history 
of feminist literary criticism, Lillian Robinson attacked academic 
critics for eschewing political responsibilities.  She, however, went on 
to wonder if the very act of writing literary criticism was futile, since 
it investigated literature which most people did not read.  I think she 
was wrong to have this worry, for it seems to me that non-academics 
read and for all the right reasons—to see alternatives, to better 
understand their lives and to survive.  Because of this, literary 
criticism is in a somewhat different position from other disciplines, 
since our “raw material” and “data” are accessible to the non-
specialist.  (29) 
 
2 On this occasion, it seems more appropriate to speak of white racism rather than 
race for it seems that white racism and not race is our intended focus when we talk 
about whiteness.  When I use the term racism, then, it is with the understanding that 
racism originates, in the context of this paper, in whiteness, and is not, as Ann Russo 
corrects, “amorphous” (299).  
 
3 Roxana Ng offers ethnicity as an alternative term for race.  She explains that “the 
indicators for ‘ethnicity’ as an analytical category are descent, common religion, and 
a shared feeling of belonging to the same group” (“Sex, Racism, Canadian 
Nationalism” 229).  I would like to add to Ng’s list of indicators sometimes shared 
cultural beliefs, practices, and/or language.   
 
4 Judith Butler explains how she conceptualizes gendered performativity: 
There is a tendency to think that sexuality is either constructed or 
determined; to think that if it is constructed, it is in some sense free, 
and if it is determined, it is in some sense fixed.  These oppositions do 
not describe the complexity of what is at stake in any effort to take 
account of the conditions under which sex and sexuality are assumed.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
The ‘performative’ dimension of construction is precisely the forced 
reiteration of norms.  In this sense, then, it is not only that there are 
constraints to performativity; rather, constraint calls to be rethought as 
the very condition of performativity. Performativity is neither free 
play nor theatrical self-presentation; nor can it be equated with 
performance.  Moreover, constraint is not necessarily that which sets 
a limit to performativity; constraint is, rather, that which impels and 
sustains performativity.  (qtd. in Salih, 344) 
 
5 One of my committee members, Dr. Yin Liu, was able to clarify the discrepancy 
between the two definitions for me, explaining: “The difference between a painter’s 
definition of white and a physicist’s definition of white is simple.  A painter is 
dealing with pigments, which reflect light [. . .] whereas a physicist is ordinarily 
dealing with emitted light itself.  Emitted white light is composed of all colours…for 
a painter, however, white is what you get before you add pigment, and thus is 
considered the absence of all colours (i.e. the absence of all pigment).” 
 
6 The word organized, as I’ve used it here, connotes the categorization of all things, 
more specifically, alludes to the development and application of the scientific 
method and taxonomy by Western people. 
 
7 My supervisor, Susan Gingell, astutely pointed out that the male colonizer’s act of 
naming mirrors Adam’s naming of the animals, in the Book of Genesis. 
 
8 While I used a substantive amount of American white theory, I deliberately filtered 
the theory, rejecting that which did not seem relevant, and keeping that which 
seemed to have applications in the Canadian context.  For example, I have avoided, 
where possible, theory that employs the black/white dichotomy, finding it 
problematic, as does Richard Dyer, because it “excludes a huge range of people who 
are neither white nor black” (11). 
 
9 Canada has its own history involving both black slavery and Aboriginal genocide, 
but for the moment, I wish to highlight what I believe to be the reason (s) why 
American whiteness theory tends to focus on a black/white dichotomy. 
 
10 Moodie enthusiastically addresses “British mothers of Canadian sons”(30), but her 
enthusiasm turns to disadain when she engages with “thin weasel-faced Yankee[s]” 
(92), or when she reflects on the Irish man she knows “with more wisdom than is 
generally exercised by Irish emigrants” (162). 
 
11 Such jokes and stereotypes directed toward white ethnic minorities, while 
detrimental, do not have the same impact since the white ethnic minority is always 
“white” but not always apparently “ethnic.” 
 
12 Frye has coined the term “whiteliness” as opposed to “whiteness” because of the 
comparisons she draws between the conceptions of gender and the conceptions of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
race.  “Whitely” and “whiteliness” are racially-specific terms that mirror those of 
“masculine” and “masculinity” as gender-specific terms (“White Woman Feminist” 
151-52).  Is it coincidental that in the word “whiteliness” echoes the word 
“saintliness”?  
 
13 This metaphor breaks down, as Susan Gingell pointed out, when we consider that 
unlike the systems of whiteness, the systems of the body are not organized in a 
hierarchical manner.  It occurred to me, though, that the body, when in shock, will 
“privilege” some systems and organs over others, diverting blood from the 
extremities to the essential organs to ensure the survival of the organism. 
 
14 I first wrote this story about two years ago.  When I reread it now, as a member of 
the community, rather than someone who had recently moved into the community, I 
am uncomfortable with the way I depicted my neighbourhood.  I have become 
defensive about the ways in which the media and others describe us and the place 
where we live—I have yet to read any positive depiction of that place.  Why doesn’t 
anyone see the children who play outside all day, rather than sitting in front of 
television sets and video games?  Why don’t reporters comment on the way the 
community members support one another in the event of a tragedy, like when a 
house fire claimed the lives of a mother and her two young children?  Does no one 
see the young father who leaves in the dark winter morning everyday to go to his 
job?  While it would be dangerous to ignore the social and economic problems that 
affect our neighbourhood, it is equally dangerous (and demoralizing) to be solely 
characterized by these problems. 
 
15 How much of myself do I project when I speculate on how others perceive me, and 
how much, I wonder is accurate (or perhaps, not accurate enough.  Do I read 
“suspicious” in a glance that is really “angry?”)? 
 
16 The term tolerance is one that frequently appears in institutional mandates and 
mission statements, in educational goals and objectives, and innumerable other 
locations when referring to the coming together of people of multiple ethnicities.  
For years I found the word troubling and, in 1992, even pressed my daughter’s 
daycare to remove the word from its formal policy.  I finally looked the word up in 
the OED and discovered that my discomfort with the word—for it felt patronizing—
was legitimate.  The definitions, while applicable to a wide range of disciplines 
(from forestry to physics), all describe a stronger entity “enduring,” “withstanding,” 
or “surviving despite” a “pain,” “hardship,” “poison,” potentially detrimental 
“environmental [condition],” or a “parasite or otherwise pathenogenic organism.” 
The more recent definition of the word as used in a social context is “the disposition 
to be patient or indulgent to the opinions or practices of others; freedom from bigotry 
or undue severity in judging the conduct of others; forbearance; catholicity of spirit.”  
When the word tolerance is used in a social context, one cannot ignore the preceding 
definitions nor the implication that tolerance is exhibited by the “benevolence” of the 
white majority. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 One means of reaching denial is to focus on the “point system” of inequalities.  
This way of viewing social inequality focuses sometimes upon categorizing people 
as either oppressed or privileged (e.g. a black man is oppressed, but a white man is 
privileged) and/or trying to place people on a continuum of oppression in 
comparison to other people (the white woman may be oppressed as a woman but she 
is privileged as a white, so she is generally more privileged than her Aboriginal 
counterpart).  The problem with this way of thinking is two-fold.  First, it encourages 
people to situate other people in positions of greater and lesser power (positions that 
those people situated may not feel accurately represents who they are because of 
their autonomy and empowerment gained from sources outside the dominant culture) 
and second, the complexities of identity and community are ignored or 
oversimplified for the purpose of “organization.” Alicia Dojourne Oritz captures the 
complexity of identity when she declares, “‘I am a crowd, a one-woman march, 
procession, parade, masquerade’” (qtd. in Neuman 222). 
 
18 Neither the analogy to the recovering alcoholic nor that to the recovering anorexic 
seems adequate by itself, for the “recovering white” is one who has both been filled 
with something toxic (racist thought), and also starved of something needed (racial 
self-awareness).  I use both terms, then, to supplement one another. 
 
19 I feel it necessary to note that once I moved beyond my feelings of guilt and 
shame, I felt a feeling I have never experienced before, one for which I have no 
name.  I would not call it a feeling of liberation or freedom, for as a “newly 
accountable” white person, I realized that I had, quite literally, a lifetime of work 
ahead of me.  Yet I did feel that I had left behind emotions and beliefs that were 
detrimental or useless.  To be able to let go of those things for which I had held 
myself responsible was a relief, and to be able to openly take responsibility for those 
things that I could and had to change was and is empowering.  Rather than struggle 
to display that “I am not a racist,” I feel free to acknowledge the ways in which my 
white privilege and cultural upbringing have made me racist, and to move forward to 
address these flaws.  No longer is there the fear of being uncovered or exposed, a 
repression or tension under which I was not even entirely aware I was living.  
 
12 In her essay “The In-Between is Reciprocal,” Marlatt names this work yet again, 
calling it “fictional autobiography” (116). 
 
13  Labeling Ana Historic “a novel” is also ironic since Marlatt’s writing undermines 
and subverts nearly every style and convention typical of the genre.  The plot is 
fragmented and non-linear, the characters are often conflated, and the style is as 
much poetry as prose. 
 
14  In “Difference (em)bracing” and other writings, Marlatt reveals how close she was 
to the people in Penang who worked for her parents (134).  Her Amahs were like 
family to the child Marlatt and had a significant impact on her development; they 
undoubtedly greatly contributed to the consciousness and concerns evident in her 
writing. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
23  Antiracist critics such as Roxanna Ng find Canadian multiculturalism problematic 
because multiculturalism focuses on celebrating culture and “difference” without 
acknowledging social hierarchies, discriminatory practices, or trying to undo 
systemic racism.  Eileen O’Brien explains, quoting bell hooks: “Whereas nonracists 
merely profess tolerant attitudes and think everyone should be treated equally, 
antiracists not only acknowledge that not everyone is treated equally but work ‘daily 
[and] vigilantly’…to combat this inequality” (253). 
 
24 See Susanna Egan’s Patterns of Experience in Autobiography for an analysis of 
the “unfolding of life events” in autobiography. 
 
25 To do Marlatt justice, and under ideal circumstances, I would need to be able to 
devote an entire chapter to lesbian theory and Marlatt’s contributions to this field, 
but for the sake of economy, I can only ever so briefly summarize her work that is 
most relevant to my task.   
 
26 It is important to note that because Marlatt was involved in a heterosexual adult 
relationship and gave birth to and raised a child, she has had (adult) experiences in 
both the realm of heterosexual and lesbian relationships, lending further credibility to 
her assertions since they are based on her ability to compare experiences. 
 
27 For a fascinating treatment of some of the lesbian issues at play in Ana Historic, 
see Heather Zwicker’s “Daphne Marlatt’s ‘Ana Historic’: Queering the Postcolonial 
Nation.”  I found Zwicker’s analysis of Marlatt’s use of the Frankenstein and closet 
motifs particularly illuminating and engaging. 
 
28 Eakin suggests that the “first person of autobiography is truly plural in its origins,”  
a notion that we easily forget in the genre of autobiography because it “promotes an 
illusion of self-determination: I write my story; I say who I am; I create myself” 
(“Relational Selves” 63).  Marlatt’s emphasis on connections and a “relational” 
vision suggests to me that her lowercase “i” might also serve to represent a plural 
(community), rather than the illusionary self-determined “I.” Rather than using the 
self-important and self-serving “I,” she transforms this personal pronoun into a new 
pronoun that represents those who share aspects of her identity. 
 
29 The term the colonized is as problematic as terms such as the oppressed, the 
victimized, or the marginalized, because it implies that the person occupying the 
position subjected to colonizing, oppression, or marginalization is powerless and that 
their subjectivity is limited to their being colonized persons, a notion that I am trying 
to undermine when I assert that “the colonized” person is not passive.  Obviously, a 
new language is needed to refer to all parties involved in these complex 
relationships, a language that does not designate binary positions of white vs. non-
white, powerful vs. powerless, or oppressor vs. oppressed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
30 Because Marlatt’s writing so often focuses on sites where ideas intercept, blend, or 
continue, I believe she would challenge Kadar to present life writing as a genre that 
has grown out of autobiography, rather than as a genre that stands in opposition to it. 
 
31   I am using the italicized we to refer to the Canadians whose ancestors do not 
originate in Canada and the non-italicized we to refer to all Canadian residents. 
 
32  By colonial continuum, I intend to convey similar assertions made by those who 
argue for the term neo-colonialism rather than postcolonialism.  Just as the term neo- 
colonialism indicates an understanding that colonialism is not a definable historical 
event that has reached an end, so the term colonial continuum recognizes that the 
colonialism is ongoing, and further, is evolutionary.  Over the course of time, certain 
manifestations of colonialism have changed, but ultimately, the colonial goals 
remain very similar. Colonial goals are arguably divisible into the two categories. 
Etienne Balibar divides racism into “exclusive racism” which seeks to exterminate or 
eliminate a racial or ethnic group versus “inclusive racism” which seeks to oppress 
and exploit, “hierarchize and partition society,” emphasizing that neither manifests in 
a “pure” form (39-40). Similarly, colonialism seems to have either exclusive or 
inclusive agendas.  In the case of the colonization of Canada, the Aboriginal people 
and, later on, many of the other ethnic groups that came to comprise Canada were 
needed to open up to colonizers, populate, clear, and build upon the land, thus 
reflecting the aims of inclusive racism.  At the same time, Gonick argues that the 
“naturalization of Canada as a white nation involves a suppression of knowledge 
about the overt efforts made by government authorities to limit the numbers of non-
white citizens, as well as the brutal colonial activity directed against Aboriginal 
peoples.  Racism seems to be operating as an instrument for securing social 
solidarity” (100).  The colonial process in Canada involved and involves a push/pull 
between needing Others to occupy places on the lower rungs of the social order, and 
desiring to control the numbers of non-white Canadians, thereby ensuring the 
maintenance of white power.  Because many details of Canadian colonial history are 
so often suppressed, whites are often prevented from seeing current race relations as 
a product of long-standing difficulties among ethnic groups, and further, fail to 
recognize that whites did and do contribute to the oppression of non-white groups.  
The colonial continuum places today’s social discord in a historical context. 
 
33 One of my co-supervisors, Hilary Clark, pointed out that the Aboriginal men 
“crowded past” Ana, “asserting their space and right to existence (and perhaps, as 
well, their priority as men).  I had, indeed, overlooked this poignant detail.  I wonder, 
though, whether the men did crowd past Ana, whether Ana felt that they crowded 
past her, or whether Annie, in “making up” the scenario, did not imagine that the 
men crowded past Ana.  Each interpretation is plausible, yet each carries with it 
significantly different implications.   
 
34 I was much surprised to discover in Heather Zwicker’s article “Daphne Marlatt’s 
‘Ana Historic’: Queering the Postcolonial Nation,” a section wherein she considers 
the same quotation I had also chosen.  She, too, acknowledges that Ana struggles 
                                                                                                                                                                    
under the tension generated between stereotype and “its refutation.”  And Zwicker, 
coincidentally, applies Bhabha’s theory to the passage, but instead she selects a 
quotation from “The Other Question.” 
 
35 Ruth is introduced as “her [Mrs. P’s] Siwash woman,” clearly indicating Mrs. P.’s 
sense of “ownership” of Ruth, and the general appropriation and commodification, 
during the building of the colonial Canada, of non-whites for unpaid or ill-paid 
labour. 
 
36 I must note, too, that when Jeannie Anderson’s labour progresses and she becomes 
more uncomfortable, she comments to Ana, “What would I do without you, my 
dear?  Things are always right when you’re here”, making Harriet invisible.  Ana 
does not speak it aloud, but objects that it is Harriet “who makes them right” (AH 
115).  While Harriet’s movements are of interest to Ana, I believe that Jeannie’s 
comments express the social hierarchies of the time.  The number of 
accomplishments that are routinely credited to white colonists and explorers but were 
actually achieved in significant part by the efforts (and suffering and sacrifices and 
deaths) of exploited non-white groups, are too many to count.  The first Canadian 
example that comes to my mind is the completion of the Canadian Pacific railroad. 
 
37 Because the acquisition of tea was one of the primary goals of many of the early 
colonialists, Marlatt’s use of the image is particularly poignant. 
 
38 Mrs. Patterson seems to be everything Ana wishes for herself.  Mrs. Patterson is 
“‘a soul attuned to the spirit of this place [. . .] bonnetless and ignorant of the cedar 
bits in her hair,’ singing with her girls on their way home from blackberry picking” 
(AH 65). 
 
39 Even Ana becomes self-conscious of the sharp contrast between English 
“civilization” and her new colonial home; she cannot overlook how out of place their 
“tea party” is in “the bush.” Ana comments, “They were surrounded by trees at the 
edge of the clearing, she knew that.  By the dark of standing timber, rain forest, and 
everywhere trees were cleared the rapid growth of bramble, salal, salmonberry 
thicket – ‘bush.’  But they were sitting with English china, Scotch shortbread, their 
talk dancing the leafdance shadow and light of weather” (AH 118). 
 
40 Further examples of Marlatt’s interest in the colonial continuum become evident 
by following the tea motif from the passages that pertain to Ana into the passages 
with Ina.  Here, too, in the immigrant who is driven to madness by, in part, her 
obsession with her appearance and reputation, tea is present.  Ina, with her tea breath, 
is as haunted by the pressure to comply with white social conventions as is Ana.  The 
passages that involve Annie and Zoe, however, frequently refer to cappuccino (AH 
91), a “café” (141), and “coffee cups [that] grew cold and [were] well-licked” (151).  
Annie and Zoe seem ultimately to have escaped the tradition that haunts both Ana 
and Ina. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
41 Dyer suggests: 
White women thus carry on—or, in many narratives, betray—the 
hopes, achievements and characteristics of the race…White women’s 
role in reproduction makes them at once privileged and subordinated 
in relation to the operation of white power in the world. (29) 
 
42 Why does this quotation refer to the woman’s freeing herself from her “mother’s 
hold,” when the betrothed woman is transferred from her father’s home (the 
patriarch) to the husband’s home (the new master)? Perhaps because Annie, our 
primary narrator, was instructed in the ways of being a woman through her mother 
rather than her father, even though patriarchal interests were the ones being 
promoted and supported. 
 
43 Hastings Mill is noteworthy as the “‘site of first white birthing,’” a child who was 
“to be from the first.  indigene.  ingenuus (born in), native, natural, free(born) – at 
home from the beginning” (AH 126-7).  Previous to the birth of Jeannie Anderson’s 
son, “about the only births were Indian births” (AH 117).   The devaluing “only” in 
the previous phrase indicates why it was “only” when the Anderson child was born 
that the area warranted an “English geographic name” and a “transplant label” (AH 
127). 
 
44 Heather Zwicker argues very convincingly that “the dominant pedagogy of the 
ideal nation is that of assimilation.”  We are born, and then may experience 
“dislocation” as exiles or emigrants, or through differences such as race, gender, 
class, or sexuality.  These “dislocations often precipitate dissent, which the nation-
state then attempts to recuperate through such institutions as marriage, citizenship, or 
other forms of socioeconomic enfranchisement” (165).  Ana’s dislocation and dissent 
have her teetering between her “natural” state and a “naturalized” state (marriage and 
citizenship).   
 
45 Susan Gingell suggests that Ina believes her children will belong in Canada 
because she thinks of Canada as a white country, and because the British are the 
“best kind of white,” they are sure to belong.  Ina’s depression may come in part, 
then, from her inability to reconcile her expectations of Canada with the reality of 
her situation. 
 
46 Marlatt’s ironic use of the “black slave” songs is not lost on me, and yet I wonder 
where Ina would have had the occasion to learn these songs?  How likely is it that 
she would have learned and sung these songs? 
 
47 Marlatt writes experimentally beyond the covers of Ana Historic, challenging 
socio-political assumptions evident in the conventions of standard English. 
 
48 Eakin suggests that a parent’s story can “relay cultural scripts for the enrolment of 
a life” and that children are as marked by what they aren’t told as what they are; they 
brood over withheld information” (“Relational Selves” 73).  Annie’s difficulty is that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the cultural script handed over by her mother does not actually prepare her for the 
Canadian performance in which ironically, Ina so wants Annie to star.   
 
49 This “immigrant” way of thinking seems to reflect the expectations of the 
American system, whereby all new citizens forever abdicate their allegiance to their 
homelands and become simply “American.”  In Canada, we claim that all new 
citizens are welcome to keep their culture alive, yet immigrants are ostracized when 
their culture is too strong, when their accents are difficult to understand, and when 
dominant culture feels its freedom is infringed upon by the needs and rights of other 
ethnicities. I am not arguing that we are no different than the United States; I 
strongly believe that although our multicultural-rather-than-melting-pot lacks 
conviction and that evidence for claims to be multicultural can be difficult to find in 
our institutions, at some level, we do aspire to a truly equitable multicultural society.  
Our attempts to achieve this society have been poor, but it is a goal worthy of 
pursuing.  
 
50 Annie refuses to become mired in factual details, focusing first on people who are 
entirely absent from the historical documents she reads.  What I find troublesome is 
that in both Ina’s and Annie’s stories (both told from Annie’s perspective) the only 
mention of other people’s ethnicity is either when referring to the Malay(?) family 
that served Ina, Annie, and the rest of their family, or when mentioning “Canadians.”  
In the passages Annie writes about Ana, Annie finds it relevant to mention Ana’s 
interaction with Native and other non-English people; for Annie exploring the 
tension between Ana and these other cultural groups (the “Kanakas from the Pacific 
islands […] and then there are always those roustabouts—Italians, Portuguese, 
Irish—you know what the Irish are like, my dear” [AH 15]) is integral to 
understanding Ana’s shaping identity.  Why then, when referring to her own family 
and identity, can she only make reference to Others whose influence was felt so long 
in the past?  Is Richard Siwash?  Is Zoe West Indian?  I imagine one of two reasons 
why Annie does not mention the ethnicities of those around her: either all of the 
people with whom she is interacting are white, in which case she does not feel the 
need to elaborate on their ethnicities, or else they are of different ethnicities, but 
Annie does not find their ethnic identities relevant to her contemporary story.  If the 
former is the case, which I highly doubt, then the situation is problematic because 
Annie (and Marlatt?) allows the “whites” to return to an unchallenged, invisible, and 
normative position.  If the latter is the case, then again, I may have difficulty with 
Marlatt’s approach.  Quite possibly (and this would be consistent with even the most 
progressive [white] thinking of the decade), Marlatt wants to portray Annie as 
“colour blind.”  Those who claim not to see people ‘of colour’ as different are often 
too uncomfortable to confront the history of racism that exists between themselves 
and those of other ethnicities.  Marlatt may also have been trying, however, to look 
at Annie’s ethnicity and national identity in the absence of a “contrast group.”  I 
don’t think there is enough evidence to decide between either of these last theories, 
and further, I wonder if the absence of any ethnic representation, outside of what I’ve 
previously mentioned, was even a deliberate choice on Marlatt’s part.  Regardless, 
that absence or omission is interesting to note, particularly since it frequently occurs 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in white people’s writing (and most often when the situation describes a private 
sphere), but for a wide variety of reasons. 
 
51 White Canadians have tried to erase non-white voices from all these places, but the 
effect that has been achieved is merely that of “whitewashing."  A whitewash covers 
over, but fails to completely obscure that which was meant to be covered, leaving an 
impression of failed or incomplete concealment. 
 
52 Ironically, Annie, in her act of reclaiming a previously lost identity, “lays down 
tracks,” an image that mirrors the railroad building efforts in early white Canada. 
 
53 Ina is chronologically sandwiched between two characters whose identities seem 
to depend heavily on their participation in life writing.  Never does the reader learn 
of any attempts that Ina might have made to record her life—to assert her 
autonomous voice.  Does her failure to write herself symbolize her failure to claim 
her identity, and thus partially explain her depression?  Carolyn Steedman offers that 
“children are always episodes in someone else’s narrative” (qtd. in Eakin, 
“Relational Selves” 68) to which Eakin adds that the “mother’s self and story 
provide the key to her [the female lifewriter’s] own” (68).  In an odd way, Annie is 
Ina’s life writer; Annie’s life is a chapter of Ina’s story, and Ina contributes 
significantly to Annie’s story.  Yet ultimately, Ina’s story is never recorded from her 
own perspective.  
 
54  Another essayist in White Out, Charles Mills, points out that “whites see black 
interests as antagonistic to their own” (43).  Perhaps because multiculturalism and 
antiracism privilege voices that were previously unheard, whites have illogically 
deduced that their voice(s) must now be silenced.  This supposition would explain 
Anderson’s assertion that whites believe they need to find ways to recentre 
themselves in the theoretical work around race. 
 
55 Just as white theorists must be cautious not to become mired in colonial guilt, so 
they must be careful not to let their personal “I”s eclipse other voices or ideas. 
 
56 An editorial note in my first draft asked if I was not “even a little” motivated by 
the lure of a “proud, attractive” white identity. I think at one point, as was inevitable, 
that I did experience a certain degree of self-satisfaction, that I had recognized and 
was now working on flaws in my perception that perhaps made me less of an 
ignorant person in any racial or ethnic circle.  But this less than flattering effect was 
not what motivated (or continues to motivate) me in my work. 
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